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SURVIVABILITY STUDY OF A FLIR EQUIPPED FIGHTER ON A NIGHT PENETRATION OF A SOVIET ARMY

THESIS

AFIT/GST/OS/81M-9

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ON A NIGHT PENETRATION OF A SOVIET ARMY.

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the School of Engineering
of the Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science

bу

Warren J. Leek Major USAF Richard W. Schmitt Major USAF

Graduate Strategic and Tactical Sciences

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Pretace

an aid in conducting low altitude operations in fighter aircraft is receiving widespread attention. As experienced fighter pilots, the authors of this research project were interested in quantitatively evaluating the FLIR's enhancement of fighter survivability. The thesis specifically addresses its effect on the night battlefield air interdiction mission.

we wish to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Frank Campanile and Mr. Dick Sudheimer, from the Mission Area Analysis branch of the Aeronautical Systems Division, in providing background information for the project. We also wish to thank Lt Col Tom Clark, our faculty advisor, for his assistance and support throughout the research effort.

Finally, we wish to thank our wives, Cindy Leek and Claudia Schmitt, for their patience and understanding throughout the long hours spent on this project.

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Warren J. Leek Richard W. Schmitt

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The hanflass system provides the fighter pilot with a forward looking intrared (FLIR) system, which allows him to fly the aircraft lower and faster than he would otherwise be able to fly. The objective of this research effort was to determine whether this increased capability will significantly improve the fighter's survivability in the night interdiction role. The problem was studied in the context of the threats and terrain found in the central region of Vest Germany.

A model of the terrain features and threat scenario was constructed using the SLAM computer simulation language. The Soviet defensive systems can be moved around as desired, and aircraft can enter the system at a variety of arrival intervals, airspeeds, and altitudes. Defensive systems that are within range of the aircraft will shoot at it, provided they are not tied up with a previous aircraft, blocked by terrain, or prevented from shooting because of a low probability of kill.

The capability to fly taster did not significantly increase the fighter's survivability. A decrease in altitude from 1000 feet to 500 feet increased survivability to a minor degree, while a further decrease to 250 feet improved survivability significantly. These findings led to the conclusion that a strong effort should

the made to develop a ralk of high enough resolution to allow the pilot to fly the mission at an altitude of 250 teet or below.

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SURVIVABILITY STUDY OF A FLIR EQUIPPED FIGHTER

On A NIGHT PENETRATION OF A SOVIET ARMY

I Introduction

Background

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United States Air Force efforts in the close air support and interdiction roles have traditionally emphasized daytime applications of airpower. The reason for this emphasis is that we simply do not have aircraft capable of delivering weapons at night with the accuracy needed to destroy pinpoint targets.

Admittedly, the F-III is heavily committed to the night interdiction role; however, its usefulness is restricted to large stationary targets which can be located on the basis of a radar prediction that was prepared long before the mission was flown. It has virtually no capability to locate small, mobile targets, such as tank columns, nor does it have a substantial ability to destroy such targets if it does locate them.

To improve the night capabilities of our fighter force, several USAF agencies are working on a system known as Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared System for Night (LANTIRN). Basically, LANTIRN is a pod which will be attached to an F-16 or an A-10. The pod has a

forwar. Lookin, intrared (FLIR) capability which will link up with the pilot's head-up display (RUD) to give him a sideo raster representation of the terrain in front of the aircraft, within a limited (30 wide by 20 high) field of siew. Another section of the pod will automatically acquire targets within the POD's field of view, point them out to the pilot, and fire Imaging Infrared (IIR) Maverick missiles at the targets if the pilot consents. The goal specified for the system is an ability to acquire, classify, and fire at up to 6 targets in a 7 second time period.

The LANTIRN system, when it is fully developed, will represent a substantial advance in the state of the art in several fields. Development of the CO2 laser, which is to provide surreptitious terrain following information, will major technological require some breakthroughs. Developing the ability to automatically find and classify targets will also be a formidable task. A 6-rail Maverick launcher must be developed, and the missiles themselves will very likely have to be modified so that the second through sixth missiles fired will stay locked on to their targets rather than locking on to the missiles fired just before them. These are just a few of the problems that must be solved before the system can become operational.

droblem Statement

sefore discussing the technology required to develop and optimize the system, a very basic question must be addressed. How is LANTIRN going to affect the survivability of the aircraft that is carrying it?

This thesis compares the survivability of a nypothetical tactical fighter employing a FLIR system on a night battlefield air interdiction (3AI) mission with the same aircraft flying the same mission without the FLIR. The fighters penetrate the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and fly through a typical array of defenses of a Soviet ground army to strike a target at the rear of the ground army's area of operations. The FEBA is assumed to be somewhere near the East German border in central West Germany.

<u>Objective</u>

because of the pilot's ability to "see" the terrain ahead of him using the FLIR, he will be able to fly lower and faster than he would be able to fly without the FLIR. The objective of this thesis is to determine whether the increased capability of the aircraft provided by the FLIR will significantly improve its survivability in the night interdiction role.

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In this thesis, the fighter's survivability in the night and role is analyzed, with the constraint that the fighter must perform a low altitude penetration of the enemy army to reach the target area. Under certain, perhaps most, conditions, a high altitude ingress might result in a better probability of survival for the fighter, but this does not reduce the need to determine the FLIR's enhancement of survivability in a low altitude penetration. Weather conditions might, for example, make it impossible to perform a high altitude ingress and subsequent letdown to low altitude approaching the target. Furthermore, a low altitude ingress will allow the fighter to acquire and engage targets of opportunity enroute to the target area; these targets would be out of range if a high altitude ingress were made.

The model studies the problem only in the context of the terrain features of central West Germany, which consists predominantly of rolling farmland mixed with thick forests. The trends shown in the study should apply to other terrain types, but this claim can not be categorically made.

Finally, it is important to note that the survivability figures developed by the model are useful only for comparing the various alternatives evaluated. Undoubtedly there are factors not considered in the model which will affect significantly the survivability of an

aircraft flying the scenario. Thus when the model predicts that twelve out of twenty aircraft will survive under one set of conditions and sixteen will survive under another set of conditions, the important result is the comparison between the two alternatives rather than the exact survival figures.

Threat Scenario

Each of the five Soviet ground armies stationed in East Germany has approximately 1000 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers and 1000 anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) units (Ref 6:46). These defenses are concentrated within an area 27 nautical miles (NM) wide by 54 NM long. Because the mission analyzed in the model will be flown at low altitude at night, those weapon systems which do not have the ability to acquire and engage the aircraft with radar or some other non-visual system can be eliminated. Using this criterion, four SAM systems and one AAA system were selected as representative threats in the model. They are designated as shown below:

- 1. AAA
- 2. SAM-A
- 3. SAM-B
- 4. SAM-C
- 5. SAM-D

The approximate locations of these threats in the Soviet




Figure 1. Radar-Directed Air Defense Systems

army area are shown in Figure 1.

Soviet airpower is not expected to be a threat, since Soviet doctrine calls for air defense in the forward part of the battle area to be the responsibility of the SAM and AAA units in the early stages of the war (Ref 6:46). Furthermore no known Soviet aircraft has a credible capability a_{ij} ainst a high speed, low altitude aircraft at night.

Appendix K (SFCRET) describes the threat scenario in more detailed and specific terms.

Structural Model

Figure 2 is a structural model of the air defense elements of a typical field army, as discussed in the previous subsection. It is essentially an expanded version of Figure 1, with the 5 defensive systems which pose a significant threat to the fighter arranged in "belts" which correspond as closely as possible to the positions they would actually occupy. Note that the first five belts in the structural model make up what is called the "forward" belt in Figure 1.

Figure 2 shows only the number of defensive systems in each belt; it does not show their locations. In this experiment, it is assumed that a large part of the enemy's movement of mechanized vehicles, troops, and supplies occurs along a single line of communication (LOC) which runs the length of the area of operations. Two typical

×	12 54.0 1 AAA
	11 12 43.0 54.0 1 SAM-A 1 AAA
	24.0 2 SAM-A
• • • • • • • • •	16.0 7 AAA 3 SAM-D 5cale. sites are s
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•<	3.0 25 AAA 3 SAM-C 1. Distan 2. In bel 3. Each S SAM-B,
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	4 2.0 25 AAA NOTE:
< < < 0 < 0 <	3 1.5 5 SAM-C 2 SAM-D
••••••••	25 AAA LEGEND AAA SAM-A SAM-B SAM-B SAM-B SAM-B SAM-B SAM-B
•••••••	S AAA
*	Belt#: Distance (nm): Threats:

Figure 2. Structural Model


the road networks in these figures represent the defensive weapon pelts, while the "x" marks the target area. The weapons are spread laterally along each belt, but they are concentrated most heavily near the LOC. Note that the defensive belts in Figures 3 and 4 are drawn to scale; they are not drawn to scale in Figure 2.


The fighter can theoretically enter the FEBA at any point along its 27 NM front. In the model, however, it enters within a 3 NM corridor centered at the midpoint of the area of operations (that is, the entry point can be up to 1.5 NM either side of the midpoint).

Methodology

In order to analyze the fighter survivability problem, a computer simulation model was developed from the structural model, using the SLAM simulation language.

The lateral distribution of the defensive sites along each of the twelve belts in the computer model can be varied by specifying the midpoint and the standard deviation of the defenses in the belt. The mean point of the defenses in a belt is the point at which the primary LOC crosses the belt. Aircraft can enter the system at a variety of arrival intervals, airspeeds, and altitudes. Terrain is modeled as a probability of blockage - the rougher the terrain, the higher the probability that it will block a defensive system's shot at the aircraft.





Defendice systems which shoot at an aircraft are tied up for a period of time following the shot; at the end of this period, they are released and allowed to engage other aircraft. The properties and capabilities of the model are discussed in more detail in Chapter III.

Overview

The remainder of this thesis explains in detail the simulation effort and the analysis of results. Chapter II discusses the components and concepts incorporated in the simulation model, while Chapter III discusses the model itself. In Chapter IV the data collection process and experimental design are discussed; the analysis of the data is discussed in Chapter V. Verification and validation of the model are discussed in Chapter VI. The overall results of the thesis effort are presented in Chapter VIII. Finally, recommended areas for follow-on study are discussed in Chapter VIII.

II System Structure

The system structure is composed of four basic ingredients:

- 1. Characteristics of the offensive aircraft
- 2. Characteristics of the defensive weapons
- 3. Terrain
- Command, Control, and Communications (C3) structure.

These factors are discussed in detail in the remainder of this chapter. Many of the concepts in the chapter are described in more detailed and specific terms in Appendix K (SECRET).

Defensive System Envelopes

The defensive systems modeled have the maximum and minimum ranges shown in Table I.

The minimum altitude at which a SAM can engage an aircraft is determined by the multipath angle. The aircraft must be above the horizon by at least the distance subtended by the multipath angle at the aircraft's range, for the SAM to get a shot. If there are hills, trees, or any other high terrain between the SAM and the aircraft, a straight line between the SAM site and the terrain feature can be considered to define the

TABLE I wange Envelopes of Defensive Systems.

	Tinimum Range	<u>Maximum Range</u>
$\Delta \Delta \Delta$	None	1.35 NM
3'A:1'-A	2 • 7 Nii	19.4 NM
S A A = B	4.3 NM	54 NM
SAM-C	2.2 NA	13.0 NM
SA.1-D	1.1 NH	6.5 NM

"effective" horizon. Figure 5 shows an example of this principle for a SAM with a multipath angle of .35 engaging an aircraft 40,000 feet away, with a 500 foot hill halfway between the radar and the aircraft.

The terrain in this example essentially adds 1.43° to the multipath angle, or 1000 feet to the altitude which the aircraft must have in order to be seen by the radar. Thus the aircraft must be at least 1250 feet above ground level (AGL) for the SAM to have a shot.

In addition to the multipath angle, each SAM system has an absolute minimum altitude. Any aircraft below this altitude can not be shot down by the SAM. If the SAM system in the above example had a minimum altitude of 2000 feet, it could not shoot down any aircraft below that altitude. If, on the other hand, it had a minimum altitude of 1000 feet, the lowest altitude at which it could engage the aircraft would be 1250 feet AGL, as



Figure 5. Terrain Blockage and Multipath Angle

computed previously.

The minimum altitudes and multipath angles for SAMs in the model are given in Table II.

TABLE II

Minimum Altitudes and Multipath Angles of Defensive Systems.

	dinimum Altitude	Multipath Angle
SAM-A	1000 feet	0.350
SAM-B	330 feet	0.350
SAM-C	75 feet	0.150
SAM-D	60 feet	0.250

Jamer Capability

L.

The fighter in the model carries a repeater jammer which radiates power uniformly in all directions in the hemisphere below the aircraft. The effective radiated power (ERP) of the jammer against the target tracking radars of the threats in the model is shown in Table III.

TABLE III

Effective Radiated Power of Jammer Against Defensive Systems.

	ERP
$\mathbf{A} \wedge \mathbf{A}$	1694 Watts
SAM-A	1694 Watts
SAM = B	914 Watts
S A M = C	914 Watts
SAM-D	914 Watts

Weapon System Capabilities Against an Aircraft with

The range at which a target tracking radar can pick up an aircraft is a function of the radiated power of the radar, the radar gain, the radar cross-section of the aircraft, the effective radiated power of the jammer, and the jamming-to-signal (J/S) ratio at which the radar operator is able to break through the clutter on his scope and lock on to the aircraft. All these terms are well

defined except the J/S ratio, which can vary according to weather, operator proficiency, maintenance status of the equipment, and a number of other factors. A good rule of thurb, nowever, is that a J/S ratio of about 20 decibels (db) is required to jum most target tracking radars under nost circumstances (Rer 4). As a result, it was assumed the target tracking radars of the weapon systems would be able to lock onto the aircraft as soon as a J/S ratio of 20 db or less was achieved. The formula for translating the J/S ratio into a range at which the aircraft enters the weapon system's lethal zone is

$$R = \sqrt{\frac{(J/S) Pr Gr Jt}{(4 T) (ERP)j}}$$
 (1)

where

(J/S) = jamming-to-signal ratio (dimensionless)

R = maximum lethal range (in meters)

Pr = radiated power of the radar (in watts)

Gr = radar gain (dimensionless)

Ot = radar cross-section (in square meters)

(ERP)j = radiated power of the jammer (in watts) (Ref 3:101-102)

The above formula, expressed in decibels, is

$$Rab = (1/2) \left[(J/S) db + (Pr) db + (\sigma t) db - (4\pi) db - (ERPj) db \right]$$
 (2)

. One approximate values for the detensive system. In the model are shown in Table 17.

TA"L, IV
Values for Radar kange Equation

	(4/3)	Pr	Gr	4π	(ERP)j
$A^{\dagger}A$	20 db	123 kw (50.9 dbw)	40 մա	11 db	1694 w (32.3 dbw)
5 A M = A	20 db	600 FW (57.8 dbw)		i	1694 w (32.3 dbw)
			42 db	ll db	914 w (29.6 dbw)
		(, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	41 db		914 w (29.6 dbw)
SAM+D	20 db	100 kw (50 dbw)	43 db	ll db	914 w (29.6 dbw)

Substitution of the appropriate values in the radar range formula results in the following expressions:

$\mathbf{A} A \alpha$	Rdbm	=	34.3	+	(1/2)	$(\sigma t) dbm^2$	(3)
S A 1 – A	Rdbm	=	33.1	+	(1/2)	$(\sigma_t) dbm^2$	(4)
SAN-E	Rdbm	:=	35.7	+	(1/2)	$(\sigma_t)dbm^2$	(5)
SAM-0	Rdbm	=	36.7	+	(1/2)	$(\sigma t) dbm^2$	(6)
SAM-D	Rdbm	=	36.6	+	(1/2)	(ot)dbm ²	(7)

The ranges in decibel-meters, found in the preceding formulas, can be translated into ranges in meters by the following formula:

The radar cross-section of the aircraft varies according to the aspect at which the radar is viewing the aircraft and the operating frequency of the radar. Lecause the target tracking radars of the AAA and the SAM-D operate at close to the same frequency, they will see equal cross-sections at a given aspect. The SAM-B and SAM-C can be grouped together for the same reason. Table V shows the radar cross-sections of the fighter, at various aspects, for all five weapon systems. A 0° aspect equates to a head-on view, a 90° aspect to a side profile, and a 180° aspect to a tail view.

lable VI shows the maximum range at which the aircraft is within the lethal zone (J/S of 20 or greater) for each weapon system for various aspects. These values were computed by using equations (3) through (8) in the RANGES computer program (Appendix C). Note that, in many cases, the range falls inside the minimum range of the weapon system. This indicates that the weapon system has no capability against the aircraft at that aspect. At some aspects, the maximum range given in Table VI is greater than the maximum range of the weapon system given in Table I; in these cases, the value in Table I applies.

The circular error probable (CEP) is a sphere around the aircraft, within which 50% of the missiles fired under a given set of conditions will detonate. The lethal

TABLE V

CADAR CROSS-DICTION OF FIGHTUR AGAINST DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS.

NADAR CROSS-SECTION (IN 084)

5884.01 (10.01.08)	5 A A = A	ВАМ+В, ВАС	SAM-D,
J •	10.75	3.60	8.20
) •	· . 75	. 4 ()	6.70
100.	4.65	2.55	1.90
15.	-2.33	3.03	3.48
20.	¥ • 5 O	1.70	. 85
25.	2.75	2.50	3.95
39.	1.20	10.65	5.20
კ 5.	- 1.65	7.95	-1.20
40.	2.15	3.45	1.70
45.	4.70	3.70	0.35
50.	1 - 75	95	3.10
55.	1.10	65	1.00
60.	-4.00	95	1.90
65.	. 43	.05	8.19
70.	9.23	8.45	
75.	13.73	14.55	13.43 16.70
80.	13.98	16.35	
85.	16.38	16-00	16.08
90.	25.85	24.98	24.38 19.23
95.	20.63	19.95	16.58
100.	17.00	15.75	
105.	7.03	9.20	5.83 9.50
110.	9.80	8.73	6.20
115.	1.75	3.65	7.85
120.	 75	2.33	4.28
125.	23 -2.33	3.13 3.03	3.48
130.	-2.33	-1.08	4.35
135.	-1.28	-2.60	3.90
140.	-1.90	.50	6.00
145.	2.78	.55	5.23
150.	6.55	.43	6.93
155. 160.	•50	.58	2.95
	• 5 5	6.38	4.73
165. 170.	4.15	6.53	9.93
175.	4.63	8.85	13.50
180.	.98	9.48	15.05
100.	. , 0	, , , ,	

Table VI

Maximum Ranges at Which a J/S Ratio of 20 or Above is Obtained

PLINCTION KANGE (IN NO)

v(1.1.1.1					
(.) ()	1.00	$1/A\ln - A$	SA. (-1)	S A C	SAM-D
	1. /4	4.30	3.04	3.82	5.79
5.	1.14	1.90	2.10	2.04	4.87
1 : .	1.81	1.88	2.69	3.39	2.80
15.	· 17	. 84	2.84	3.5 %	3.36
200	1.60	1.92	2.44	3.07	2.48
	7.29	1.51	2.68	3.37	3.55
300 -	2.64	1.27	6.84	8.61	4.10
× 0 •	1 - 2.7	. 91	5.01	6.31	1.96
4.1.	1.77	1.41	2.98	3.70	2.74
4 17 .	0.02	1.89	3.07	3.87	4.68
) · / •	2.08	1.35	1.80	2 • 2 6	3.22
·	1.03	1.25	1.86	2.34	2.53
t) v! •	1.81	. 70	1.80	2.26	2.80
65.	1.50	1.16	2.02	2.54	2.32
i i	3.73	3.19	5.31	6.68	5.78
,) •	0.82	5.36	10.71	13.49	10.56
≿J.	9.94	5.51	13.18	16.59	15.39
33.	9.25	7.27	12.66	15.94	14.33
90.	24.06	21.62	35.59	44.81	37.27
95.	13.30	12.20	19.95	25.11	20.60
100.	9.80	7.80	12.30	15.48	15.18
105.	2.34	2.48	5.79	7.28	4.40
116.	4.34	3.41	5.48	6.90	6.72
115.	2.97	1.35	3.05	3 • 8 4	4.60
126.	3.59	1.01	2.62	3.30	5.56
125.	2.38	1.07	2.88	3.62	3.68
130.	2.17	. 84	2.84	3.58	3.36
135.	2.40	1.11	1.77	2.23	3.71
140.	2.28	.95	1 - 49	1.87	3.53
145.	2.90	.89	2.13	2.68	4.49
150.	2.65	1.52	2.14	2.69	4.11
155.	3.23	2.34	2.11	2.65	5.00
160.	2.04	1.17	2.14	2.70	3.16
165.	2.51	1.17	4.18	5.26	3.88
170.	4.56	1.78	4.25	5.36	7.06
175.	6.88	1.88	5.56	7.00	10.65
186.	8.22	1.23	5.98	7 • 5 2	12.73

the faction (1.3) is that distance from the SAS detonation within which as many aircraft survive as are killed by detonations beyond it. It is a function of both the type missibe and the type aircraft. The lithal radius concept allows the model to assume a "cookie cutter" approach in that all aircraft within the lethal radius will be killed and all aircraft beyond it survive. The lethal radius of each of the SAM systems in the model, with respect to the righter modeled, is given in Table VII.

To state of the st

TABLE VII

Lethal Radii of SAM Systems

	<u>Lethal Radius</u>
SAM-A	185 feet
SAM-B	143 feet
SA:1-C	86 feet
SAM-D	72 feet

The probability of kill is related to both the CEP and the lethal radius by the following formula:

$$(LR/CEP)$$

$$Pk = 1 - .5$$
(9)

Into specific capabilities of the five defensive systems in the model are described in the remainder of this sub-section.

SAM-A. The kill zone (the area in which the J/S ratio is 20 ab or less) of the SAM-A is snown in Figure 6. Note that, with the exception of small "spikes" near the 0° and 155° points, the entire kill zone lies within a narrow band near the 90° aspect angle. The target tracking radar can not begin tracking the aircraft until it reaches the leading edge of the kill zone, and, because the missile is command guided, it must reach the aircraft before it is masked by jamming at the trailing edge of the kill zone.

As stated previously, the Pk outside the kill zone is zero. Within the kill zone, the CEP is related to the J/S ratio at the time of intercept by the following formula:

CEP =
$$\sqrt{.0000252 \text{ (J/S) R}^2 + 9610 \text{ (J/S)} + 671}$$
 (10)

where R is in meters, and

The said of the state of the said of the s

(J/S) is a real number (not in decibels).

Obviously, the lowest CEPs will result when the aircraft is close to the SAM site and the aspect is 90° (maximum radar cross-section, minimum J/S ratio). However, an intercept at the 90° point will never occur with the SAM-A because of the narrow kill zone. Engagements will occur near the trailing edge of the kill zone, if they occur at




Figure 6. Lethal Envelope of SAM-A

all.

SAM-B. The kill zone of the SAM-B is shown in Figure 7. While the missile has a maximum range of about 54 NM, it is shown out to only 26 NM because the kill zone becomes too narrow for the missile to have a chance of intercepting an aircraft beyond that range. The "spikes" at the 30° and 180° aspects are too small to give the SAM-B a shot at the aircraft. Thus the kill zone is restricted to the band near the 90° aspect. The CEP for the SAM-B is computed using the formula:

$$CEP = \sqrt{.00000562 \text{ (J/S) R} + 2500 \text{ (J/S)} + 232}$$
 (11)

 $\underline{SAM-C}$. The kill zone of this missile is shown in Figure 8. The CEP of the missile is determined by the formula:

CEP =
$$\sqrt{(.00000071) (J/S) R} + 2200 (J/S) + 58$$
 (12)

Unlike the SAM-A and SAM-B, the SAM-C appears to have a significant chance of killing the aircraft at aspects other than those near the 90° point; the spikes near 25° and 180° look particularly promising. The 25° spike is the longer of the two; however, an aircraft entering this area would be well past the 25° point before a missile could reach it, even with minimum reaction times. Since the radar cross-section in the $30^{\circ}-40^{\circ}$ region (where the




Figure 7. Lethal Envelope of SAM-B




Figure 8. Lethal Envelope of SAM- $\mathfrak C$

intercept would occur even under the most favorable conditions for the SAA) are less than those at the 180^6 point, an intercept at the 130^6 point was investigated.

For the 180° intercept, the missile would be able to tire two seconds (minimum lock-on time) after the aircraft reentered the kill zone at 2.2 NM. The range of the aircraft at the time the missile is fired, assuming an aircraft velocity of 480 knots, is

$$Rf = 2.2 + (480 \text{ NM/hr}) \text{ (hr/3600 sec)} (2 \text{ sec})$$

= 2.467 NM.

The point of intercept was computed iteratively, using the formula

$$R = 3600 (Re - Rf) / (TAS) (Tf)$$
 (13)

where

R = range to intercept (in NM)

Re = estimated range to intercept (in NM)

Rf = range of aircraft when missile is fired (2.466 NM)

Tf = missile flyout rate (in sec/NM)

TAS = aircraft velocity (in knots)

3600 = conversion factor (knots to NM/sec).

The final iteration yielded

R = 3600 (4.20 - 2.467) / (480) (3.09) = 4.20 NM.

Thus the engagement occurs at 4.20 NM for an aircraft

travelling at a velocity of 480 knots. This range equates to 7778 meters, or 38.9 dbm. The J/S ratio for a SAM-C target tracking radar looking at the tail of the aircraft at this range is

$$J/S = (ERPj) (4\pi) R / Pr Gr \sigma_t$$

OR

$$(J/S)db = (ERPj)db + (4\pi)db + 2(R)dbm - (Pr)db - (Gr)db - (Gr)db - (Gr)dbm$$

$$= 29.6 + 2(38.9) - 53 - 41 - 9.48$$

$$= 14.92 db$$

$$(14.92/10)$$

$$J/S = 10 = 31.05$$

The CEP is

CEP =
$$\left(.00000071\right)(31.05)(7778)^{2} + (2200)(31.05) + 58$$

= 264 m.
= 866 ft.

The probability of kill is

$$(86/866)^{2}$$
Pk = 1 - .5

Since this is the best shot that the SAM-C can expect to get against any aircraft that pass inside 2.2 NM lateral range of the missile site, the enemy doctrine

modeled dictates that the SaH-C only shoots at aircraft that pass at a lateral range of 2.2 $\rm NM$ or more.

 $5\, \frac{\rm Mi-D}{\rm D}$. The kill zone is shown in Figure 9. The CEP is determined by the formula

CEF =
$$\sqrt{.000000325 (J/S) c^2 + 1890 (J/S) + 25}$$
 (14)

Like the SAM-C, the SAM-D appears to have a significant chance of killing the aircraft at a wide variety of aspects. The most promising are the head-on view (0 $^{\circ}$ aspect) and the rear view (180 $^{\circ}$ aspect).

For the head-on view, the shot was assumed to be timed so that the intercept would occur just as the missile reached the minimum range of 1.1 NM (2037 meters or 33.1 dbm). The calculations for this shot are shown below:

$$(J/S)db = 29.6 + 11 + 2(33.1) - 50 - 43 - 8.2$$

$$= 5.6 db$$

$$J/S = 3.63$$

$$CEP = \sqrt{.000000325 (3.63) (2037)^{2} + 1890 (3.63) + 25}$$

$$= 33 m.$$

$$= 272 ft.$$

(72/272)
Pk = .5

- .047




Figure 9. Lethal Envelope of SAM-D

NM

Solving in a similar manner for an aircraft at $=a-5^6$ aspect (approximately +1 NH lateral displacement at the engagement range of 1.1 NH), a Pk of +0.33 was obtained. For aspects of 10^6 or more, the Pk's are too low to make the shot worth taking.

For the rear view, the missile was assumed to be able to fire two seconds (minimum lock-on time) after the aircraft reentered the kill zone at 1.1 NM. This problem was solved iteratively using equation (13); however, in this case

assuming the aircraft has a relocity of 480 knots. The final iteration yielded:

$$R = (2.58-1.367)(3600) / (480)(3.53) = 2.58 NM.$$

Thus the intercept occurs at 2.58 NM for an aircraft travelling at a velocity of 480 knots. This range equates to 4778 meters or 36.8 dbm. The calculations for this shot are shown below:

$$(J/S) db = 29.6 + 11 + 2(36.8) - 50 - 43 - 15.05$$

= 6.15 db

$$CEP = \sqrt{.000000325 (4.12) (4.778)^2 + (1890) (4.12) + 25}$$

- = 88.6 m
- = 291 ft

$$PK = 1 - .5$$
= .941

The above result is extremely sensitive to the aircraft's lateral displacement from the SAM-D site. An aircraft displaced only $\cdot 2$ NM from the site will have a 175^0 aspect rather than a 180^0 aspect at the time of intercept, and the Pk will drop to $\cdot 029$. An aircraft displaced $\cdot 4$ NM has a 170^0 aspect and a Pk of $\cdot 013$.

For an aircraft flying at 540 knots, the final iteration yielded an intercept range of 2.98 NM (5526 meters or 37.4 dbm). This range resulted in

$$J/S = 7.35$$

CEP = 388 feet

Pk = .023

for a direct tail shot and correspondingly lower Pk's for lateral displacements that denied the gunner a direct tail shot. The results of the above calculations are summarized in Table VIII.

TABLE VIII

Probability of Kill for SAM-D Site Within .2 NM of the Site.

<u>Sateral</u>	Displacement	TAS	Best Shot	$\underline{P}\underline{k}$
0.0 55		480/540	Frontal	.047
0-1-88		480/540	Frontal	.033
0.2 NM		480	Rear	.029
0+2 NM		540	Rear	.023

Beyond .2 NM lateral displacement, the Pk's fall below 2%, which is the minimum Pk at which the missile is allowed a shot according to the C3 assumptions of the experiment. The C3 structure is explained later in this chapter. The coverage of the SAM-D falls into three regions, as shown in Table IX:

TABLE IX
Engagement Parameters of the SAM-D.

Lateral Displacement	Aspect at Which Shot is Taken
02 NM	Front or Rear
.2 - 1.1 NM	None
1.1 - 6.5 NM	Side

well outside the lethal envelope of the gun itself, with the exception of a small band at the 35 aspect angle. As with the SAMs, these ranges assume the J/S ratio must be less than 20 db for the tracking radar to lock on to the aircraft. Because the AAA radar can see the aircraft well before it enters the lethal envelope, it is assumed that the AAA can engage any aircraft that is within its lethal envelope.

The lethal envelope of the AAA is shown in Figure 10, with the points at which the AAA gunner is expected to attempt to engage an incoming aircraft indicated by the heavy line. If the aircraft passes the AAA site at close enough a range, it is assumed that the gunner will attempt to engage it at a slant range of about 3000 feet. This allows him to avoid the mechanical difficulties associated with tracking an aircraft moving at a high angular velocity overhead. Once the 3000 foot ring reaches a 45° aspect, however, the gunner is dealing with an aircraft moving at a high angular velocity in the horizonal plane. Therefore the gunner is expected to attempt to engage the aircraft along the 45° line until the maximum range of the gun is reached. If an aircraft passes the 45° line outside the AAA's lethal range, the gunner will shoot as soon as the aircraft hits the maximum lethal range of 8200 feet.




Figure 10. Lethal Envelope of AAA

To determine a Pk for the AAA, it is necessary to first determine the velocity of the bullet at the time of intercept. This is determined by the equation

$$-(p Cd A k / 2 m)$$

$$VI = VI e$$
(15)

where

Vt = intercept velocity

Vi = muzzle velocity (3050 ft/sec for the AAA)

p = air density (.002378 slugs/cu ft)

Cd = drag coefficient (.38 is a good average value)

A = cross sectional area (.004477 sq ft for the AAA)

R = intercept range (in thousands of feet)

m = mass of the bullet (.43 pounds for the AAA) (Ref 2:32).

When the above values are used in equation (15), it reduces to

$$-.1513 R$$
 Vf = 3050 e (16)

Once the velocity of the bullet at intercept is known, the time of flight of the bullet can be calculated by the equation

$$TOF = \frac{2 m}{p \ Cd \ A} \left(\frac{1}{Vf} - \frac{1}{Vi} \right)$$
 (17)

where TOF is the time of flight in seconds, and all other values are the same as they were defined previously (Ref

2:34). Then the appropriate values are used in equation (17), it reduces to

$$TOF = (6601.76/Vf) - 2.1645$$
 (18)

once the bullet time of flight has been determined, the single shot probability of kill can be computed using the equation

$$Pkss = \frac{A_{V}}{2\pi\sigma^{2} + A_{V}} e^{\frac{-.5(32.2g)(TOF)^{2}}{2\pi\sigma^{2} + A_{V}}}$$
(Ref. 7:98)

Av is the vulnerable area of the fighter and is determined by the formula

$$AV = (PA) (%VA)$$
 (20)

where

PA = presented area (total area exposed to the gun)

%VA = percentage of the presented area that will

result in a kill of the aircraft if hit.

The PA varies according to the aspect at which the gun site is viewing the fighter, but a good average figure for the fighter in the model is 265 square feet. Similarly, the %VA varies with aspect, but 21% can be used as an average figure. Thus

$$Av = (265) (.21)$$

for the fighter in the model.

O is the will dispersion of the gun. A one mildispersion produces up to one foot of error for each thousand teet of range between the gun and the target. A reasonable estimate of a value of for the AAA under combat conditions is 20 mils. Thus

$$\sigma = 20 R$$

for the AAA, since R is expressed in thousands of feet (at a range of 2500 feet, R = 2.5).

The term g is the number of "g"s being pulled by the pilot at the time the bullet is fired. All other terms in equation (20) are as defined previously.

When the appropriate values are used in equation (19), the equation becomes

$$Pkss = \frac{55.65}{2\pi (20R)^2 + 55.65} e^{\frac{-16.1g (TOF)^2}{2\pi (20R)^2 + 55.65}}$$
(21)

Finally, the overall Pk for a burst from the AAA is found using the formula

$$PV = 1 - (1 - Pkss)$$
 (22)

where n = number of rounds fired in the burst.

In this experiment, the gunner is assumed to always shoot

a 50 round burst (about 2/3 of a second). This is tactically sound because longer bursts will heat up the barrels and do permanent damage to the gun. Thus

$$PR = 1 - (1 - PKSS)$$
 (23)

Engagement Times for Weapon Systems

All the SAN's in the model must go through four distinct stages in order to engage an aircraft. At the end of the fourth stage they are ready to engage the next aircraft. The stages are listed below:

1. Target acquisition.

- 2. Tracking and missile firing.
- 3. Missile flyout time (the SAM operator must monitor and guide the missile until it either hits or misses the target).
- 4. Confounding delay (all delays associated with getting the launchers and radars ready for the next target).

The AAA goes through the same stages except the flyout time stage. Once the bullets have left the muzzle, the gunner has no control over them and thus does not need to monitor them.

The times associated with the above four stages are given in Table \mathbf{X}_{\bullet}

 $\label{eq:table_X} TABLE \ X$ Times Required for AAA and SAA Operations.

	Acquisition		Track / Fire		Flyout Confounding	
	.ain	аах	ain	max	Time	Delay
AAA	-	-	6 sec	25 sec	-	30 sec
5A4-1	14 500	4/ sec	4 sec	4 sec	3.13 sec/nm	13 sec
SAN-8	10 sec	22 sec	2 sec	4 sec	2.44 sec/nm	15 s ec
S A. (- C	15 sec	30 sec	2 sec	3 sec	3.09 sec/nm	30 sec
5A.1-1	3 sec	20 sec	2 sec	3 sec	3.53 sec/nm	30 s ec

The acquisition time of the AAA is included in the track/fire column in Table X.

Because the jammer concentrates its effort on the target tracking radars. the acquisition radars of the weapon systems are assumed to be locked on to the aircraft by the time it reaches the leading edge of the kill zone. Thus the missile has a shot at the aircraft if the sum of the tracking/firing time and the missile flyout time is less than or equal to the time during which the aircraft is in the kill zone.

For example, a SAM-C firing against a 480 knot aircraft whose displacement from the missile site is 5 NM at the point of closest approach can get a missile out to the aircraft in a minimum of

2 + 3.09 (5) = 17.45 sec

and a saxious of

$$8 + 3.09 (5) = 23.45 \text{ sec.}$$

The aircraft will be in the kill zone for about 3.8 NM, or 28.5 seconds, so the missile will have a shot at the aircraft. If the missile is launched in the minimum time, the aircraft will be 2.3 NM past the leading edge of the kill zone and its aspect will be 97° at the time of intercept. If the missile is launched at the maximum time, the aircraft will be 3.1 NM past the leading edge and its aspect will be 105° . The Pk of the missile would be lower in the latter case because of the higher J/S ratio at this aspect.

After firing, the missile site remains tied up until the end of its confounding delay. After the confounding delay, it is ready to acquire another aircraft. Thus the site is unable to track and fire at another aircraft until a time period equal to the sum of the confounding delay and acquisition time has passed.

The SAM-C mentioned above will be able to begin tracking another aircraft in a minimum of

$$30 + 15 = 45$$
 seconds

and a maximum of

$$30 + 30 = 60$$
 seconds

after the previous missile has reached its target

aircraft.

Terrain

the terrain in the area modeled consists of rolling tarmland mixed with thick forests. Figure 11 shows the probability of a clear line of sight existing between the weapon site and the target aircraft in this type of terrain (Ref 1:48). The probability of a clear line of sight 15 a function of the aircraft's altitude and the ground range from the weapon site to the aircraft. The data in Figure 11 is translated into a series of mathematical approximations in the computer model.

Command, Control, and Communications

The AAA's are assumed to operate relatively antonomously and will be allowed to shoot at any aircraft that come within their lethal envelopes. However, in an effort to keep all of them from getting tied up on the first aircraft that they see, only the five guns with the highest Pk in a given belt are allowed to shoot at any particular aircraft. The SAM's will be subject to more rigorous control and will not be allowed to engage an aircraft unless their probability of killing the aircraft is sufficiently high. In this model a Pk of .02 has been used as the cut-off point; if the Pk is computed to be less than .02, the missile will not fire. Only two




Figure 11. Terrain Blockage Data for Rolling Farmland with Thick, Close-in Forests

missile sites from any given belt are allowed to fire at the same aircraft.

Samuary

This section has discussed the characteristics of the oriensive aircraft and defensive weapons which comprise the system structure of the model. It has also outlined the terrain and C3 features which influence the interactions between the aircraft and the defenses. The following chapter discusses the specific steps accomplished in creating a computer model of the system.

III Simulation Model

the night interdiction problem was modeled into the SLAm network shown in Appendix A. The network merely routes the aircraft through the army area, ultimately sending each direcraft to a "kill" node if it is shot down, or a "bor.ive" node if it successfully negotiates the derensive array. The major portion of the modeling effort is contained in a series of discrete subroutines; some of these are called by the network, while others are called by other subroutines. The network and subroutines are described in more detail in the following subparagraphs.

Network

The state of the s

A total of 20 aircraft enter the network, representing the commitment of roughly a squadron of aircraft to the target complex. The time between entries is set at one of two values. When the first aircraft enters the system at a time of zero, it is routed to event node 1, which fixes the positions of all the defensive sites. These positions remain fixed for the remainder of the run. All the remaining aircraft bypass event node 1.

Each fighter crosses the FEBA as it enters the network. At .2 NM after entering, it encounters the first belt of threats, consisting of 25 AAA sites. Event node 2 determines which AAA sites shoot at the aircraft and

whether it is killed. If it is killed, ATRIB(7), the kill status variable, is set equal to zero, and the aircraft entity is sent to a pair of collect nodes which gather applicable statistics. It it is not killed, the clock advances and it proceeds another .8 MM to belt 2, which contains 25 more AAA sites.

it the fighter successfully negotiates belt 2, the clock is again advanced and it proceeds to belt 3, which contains 5 SAM-C sites and 2 SAM-D sites. It is engaged by the SAM-C's first. Event node 3 handles the SAM-C engagements. If the fighter evades the SAM-C's, it then encounters the SAM-D's at event node 4. If it is not killed by the SAM-D's, the clock is advanced once more and the fighter proceeds to belt 4, which contains 25 more AAA sites. The model proceeds in this manner until the target area, defended by one AAA site, is reached.

It the fighter penetrates all the threats in the model, it enters a collect node. The model continues to run until all 20 aircraft have been accounted for.

The computer coding of the network is found in lines 4580 through 5410 of the computer model (Appendix B).

Initialization Subroutine (Event Node 1)

The defensive sites in each belt are arranged normally along the belt, with the mean of the normal distribution being the point where the primary LOC crosses the belt. Thus the tickmarks along the road networks in

in each of the belts. The weapon sites in any belt can be tightly or loosely grouped about the LOC by varying the standard deviation of the normal distribution. While the standard deviation of the weapons in the first eleven belts in this experiment are varied, the AAA site in the target area is kept relatively close to the target with a standard deviation of only .25 NM. The initialization subroutine is contained in lines 350 through 1010 of the computer model.

Weapon System Engagement Subroutines (Event Nodes 2,3,4,5,6)

Each weapon type has its own event node, regardless of where it is physically located in the army area. These event nodes first calculate the closest point that the aircraft will pass from each weapon site during its run (lines 1460 through 1560). An aircraft altitude adjustment factor is then added to account for the inability of the pilot to precisely hold the nominal ingress altitude (lines 1570 through 1590). Subroutine PROBKIL is then called to determine the Pk of each weapon site in the belt; PROBKIL assumes the weapon site has an unobstructed shot at the aircraft (line 1610).

The next step is to determine whether the weapon site actually has a clear shot at the aircraft. Since the aircraft altitude and the horizonal distance from the

weapon site are in wm, the look-up angle is easily retermined. If the distance subtended by the multipath angle at the aircraft's horizonal range is subtracted from the aircraft altitude, an "equivalent" look-up angle can computed. The equivalent look-up angle accounts for the fact that the aircraft must be above the altitude necessary to achieve a line-of-sight by at least the distance subtended by the multipath angle, for the weapon site to engage the aircraft. If the aircraft in Figure 5 were at an altitude of 1250 feet, for example, its equivalent altitude would be 1000 feet. The look-up angle would be 1.78° , while the equivalent look-up angle would 1.43⁶. Once the equivalent look-up angle is determined, it is tested against a mathematical expression of the data in Figure 11 to determine the probability that the site is blocked by terrain. A random draw is then made to determine whether the weapon site was actually blocked. If so, Pk is set equal to zero; if not, the Pk as determined in the PROBKIL subroutine. These steps are accomplished in lines 1630 through 1800 of the model.

If the weapon site is determined to have a shot at the aircraft, the model checks to see whether the site is already engaged with an earlier aircraft (lines 1820 through 1910). Once the model has determined which sites have an opportunity to engage the aircraft and are not already tied up with another aircraft, subroutine SORT is called (line 1930). This subroutine (lines 2550 through

2300) uses a bubble sort technique to rank the weapon sites according to their Pk's. It then picks the five AAA sites, or two SAM sites, which have the highest Pk's, and allows them to fire at the aircraft if their Pk's are high enough to meet the minimum criteria (lines 1950 through 2080). The missile systems must have a minimum Pk of .02 to be allowed to fire, while the top five AAA sites can fire at any aircraft within their lethal envelopes, as discussed in the Command, Control, and Communications portion of Chapter II.

Missile sites which are allowed to fire at the aircraft are then tied up and placed on the event calendar; they are released and permitted to engage another aircraft at the end of a time period equal to the sum of their track/fire time, flyout time, confounding delay, and acquisition time. AAA sites are treated in the same manner, except that their tie-up time is the sum of only the track/fire time and the confounding delay, as discussed in Chapter II. These steps are accomplished in lines 2100 through 2240 and lines 2340 through 2530 of the program.

Finally, the model determines which weapon sites actually achieve a kill by comparing a number obtained from a random drawing to the Pk determined in the PROBKIL subroutine. If the aircraft is killed, ATRIB(7) is set equal to one, and the aircraft is terminated in the network. These steps are accomplished in lines 2260

through 2310.

Probability of Kill Subroutine

This subsection discusses the probability of kill calculations for the AAA, and it discusses the SAM-D as a representative SAM system. The method used is the same for all SAM systems.

The AAA portion of the PROBKIL subroutine first determines whether the aircraft is within range. If so, the subroutine then determines the number of "g"s on the aircraft. Because of the high density of AAA sites in the front four AAA belts, the pilot is assumed to begin jinking maneuvers approaching the FEBA. The purpose of jinking is to defeat the tracking capability of the AAA; this is accomplished by making a series of random turns. The pilot will have an average of 2 "g"s on the aircraft while performing the jinking maneuvers, and he will continue jinking until he is one minute past the FEBA. He will then maintain an average of 1.3 "g"s in wings level, terrain following flight, until reaching the target area. the target area he will maintain an average of 3 "g"s while delivering his ordnance. Once the "g" loading is determined, the intercept range is computed in accordance with Figure 10 of Chapter II. Finally, the amount of time the gun will be tied up is calculated. These steps are shown in lines 3230 through 3450 of the model.

The SAM-D portion of the PROBKIL subroutine first looks at the lateral range of the aircraft from the site. If the range is less than or equal to .25 NM, the Pk's are assigned according to Table VI. If the range is between +25 and 1.1 MM, Pk is set equal to zero and no shot is These steps are shown in lines 3520 through 3680 of the program. If the range is between 1.1 and 6.5 NM, the point of intercept must be found. The point at which the aircraft is picked up by the tracking radar is determined in lines 3840 through 3990, while the point at which the aircraft is lost by the tracking radar is determined in lines 4000 through 4060. If the missile site is able to intercept the aircraft prior to the time the aircraft reaches the 90° aspect point, the site delays its shot so that the intercept will occur at the 90° aspect, to maximize the Pk. If the site is able to intercept the aircraft within the lethal envelope, but not at or prior to the 90° aspect point, it will fire as soon as it is able. If it cannot intercept the aircraft within the lethal envelope, it w111 not fire. These determinations are made in lines 4070 through 4140. Pk of the missile shot and the tie up time of the missile are then computed in lines 4070 through 4140 of the program.

Hodel Implementation

The computer simulation model described in this chapter allows a number of factors to be varied in the night interdiction study. The specific factors used in the experiment, and manner in which these factors were allowed to vary and interact, are described in the next chapter.

IV Data Collection

Measure of Merit

In this thesis, a squadron level of twenty aircraft was put through the system in each simulation run. The measure of merit is the number of aircraft that survive each run.

Sample Size Determination

The required number of replications was determined by performing a trial experiment of five simulation runs with each factor set at level one. The results of the trial experiment were as shown below:

Run Number	Aircraft Survived
1	10
2	1 2
3	1 2
4	1 2
5	17

The objective was to be at least 95% confident that the sample mean would be within one aircraft of the true mean. To determine the number of runs required to achieve this level of accuracy, Stein's method (Ref 5:482) was used. The minimum number of runs required to achieve the desired level of accuracy is computed by the formula:

$$n_{\min} = \frac{t_{n-1}^{\alpha/2}}{c} s^2$$

where

1

n - minimum number of simulation runs required.
min

C = maximum units wrong allowable.

2
S = estimate of variance obtained in the trial
 experiment.

α/2
 t = tabulated t statistic for the (1 - α)
 n-1 confidence level with (n-1) degrees of freedom in the trial experiment.

For the trial experiment,

$$n = \frac{t_4^{.025}}{c} s^2 = (2.776/1) (6.8) = 18.9 \% 19$$

Based on this result, it was decided that five replications of each cell would be adequate. As will be shown in Chapter V. this results in 20 or more observations for all main effects, two-way interactions, and three-way interactions of the experimental factors.

Experimental Design

To quantify a solution to the problem statement of this thesis, it was necessary to design an experiment that would provide enough data about the problem to allow valid inferences to be drawn about the system behavior. The

design provides a plan for executing the experiment by structuring the inputs into a logical pattern, thereby dictating the number of experimental trials required. Five factors were considered necessary and sufficient:

- 1. Speed of the fighter.
- 2. Altitude of the fighter.
- 4. LOC network.

٢.

5. Standard deviation of defensive sites along belts.

The first factor, speed, is set at two levels: 480 knots and 540 knots. Both levels are compatible with the capabilities of the fighter and represent the airspeeds that would most likely be flown on an actual combat profile.

Altitude is considered at three levels: 1000 feet. 500 feet. and 250 feet AGL. Level one (1000 feet) represents the minimum altitude at which an aircraft not equipped with a FLIR could fly the night mission. Level two (500 feet) represents the altitude at which the mission could be flown by an aircraft with a FLIR with moderate resolution, while level three (250 feet) is the altitude at which the mission could be flown by an aircraft employing a high resolution FLIR.

The third factor, saturation, has two levels. At level one, the arrival interval is exponential with a mean of 30 seconds, while at level two, arrivals occur every

ten minutes. Thus some of the weapon sites will be tied up with previous aircraft when the arrival rate is set at level one. while all sites will be able to engage anv aircraft within range when arrivals are set at level two.

The fourth factor is the LOC network. representing the viriety of possible distances between the fighters' incress corridor and the major LOC in the sector. Level one is the LOC network shown in Figure 3, while level two is the network in Figure 4. Note that at level one the fighter crosses the PEBA at a relatively long distance from the LOC, while at level two his entry point is close to the LOC.

The fifth factor is the standard deviation of the defensive sites along the belt. At level one, the defenses are relatively spread out, with $\sigma = 6.25\,$ NM; at level two, they are more tightly clustered along the road network, with $\sigma = 3.0\,$ NM.

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The factors and levels are summarized in Table XI.

Factors and Levels to be Analyzed in the Experiment.

TABLE XI

LEVEL					
FACTOR	1	2	3		
Speed	480 knots	540 knots			
Altitude	1000 ft	500 ft	250 ft		
Saturation (interval between acit arrivals)	expon (.5 min)	!O mIn			
Mean Point of Defenses	road net 1 (not over LOC)	road net 2 (over LOC)			
or Defenses	6-25 NM	3.0 NM			

A full factorial design was used for this experiment. That is to say, the model was run with every possible combination of the factors and levels. This allowed identification and interpretation of factor interactions. Furthermore, the effect of each factor is estimated at several levels of the other factors, and thus the conclusions reached hold over a wide range of conditions. A total of

cells were analyzed. Using five replications of each cell, as discussed in Sample Size Determination, a total of 240 simulation runs was required. These runs were made in blocks of sixty, with the levels for the road network

and arrival rate in each block set as shown in Table XII.

TABLE HII

Losing Matrix for Blocks of Sixty Simulation Runs.

		Road Network	Arrival Rate
	1 - 60	!	1
Run	61 - 120	1	2
Number	121 - 189	2	1
	181 - 240	2	2

within each block, the levels for airspeed, altitude, and standard deviation of the defenses (σ) were set as shown in Table XIII.

TABLE RIII

Design Matrix Within Each Block of Sixty Simulation Runs.

FACTORS

		Airspeed	Altitude	Sigma
	1 - 5	1	1	1
	6 - 10	2	1	1
	11 - 15	2	2	1
	10 - 20	2	3	1
	21 - 25	ι	3	1
Run	26 - 30	1	2	1
Numoer	31 - 35	1	2	2
	36 - 40	1	1	2
	41 - 45	2	1	2
	46 - 50	2	2	2
	51 - 55	2	3	2
	56 - 60	1	3	2

Once the measure of merit, the appropriate sample size, and the experimental design were determined, the experiment was run. In the next chapter the method of analysis of the results is presented and interpreted.

V <u>Data Analysis</u>

tirst chase was a five-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). This output, along with input data showing the number of aircraft survived in each run, is listed in Appendix E. The second phase was a five-way ANOVA with altitude level three omitted: the output of this analysis is also found in Appendix E. The third phase was two four-way ANOVA runs with sigma held constant: this output is listed in Appendix F. The fourth phase was a four-way ANOVA using only the four factors that were found to be significant in the five-way ANOVA. This output is listed in Appendix G.

Five-Way ANOVA

This test showed that four of the five main effects (road network, aircraft arrival rate, aircraft altitude, and the standard deviation of the defenses) were significant using an alpha of .05. One main effect, aircraft velocity, was found bе t o insignificant. Four of the two-way interactions were found to be significant, while the remaining six were not. None of the three-, four-, or five-way interactions were significant.

the residual term had note than four times as many degrees of freedom as the explained variation term. tadicating that enough data points were available to product a high degree of confidence in the results.

The second secon

dain Effects. The only main effect found to statistically insignificant was the aircraft velocity. Tais result is not unexpected, since the two levels of velocity considered in the nodel are fairly close to each other. The statistical insignificance of velocity in the model means that the value of increasing the fighter's airspeed from 480 to 540 knots is small. It is not worth the the substantial fuel consumption increase that it would require. This result should not interpreted to mean that airspeed is totally insignificant as a factor in fighter survivability. In fact, verification runs showed that survivability against SAMs decreased substantially when the airspeed was decreased to 60 knots, which is well below the levels considered in the nodel.

The main effects found to be statistically significant are shown graphically in Figure 12. In interpreting this figure and all subsequent graphs in this chapter, it is important to note that the only data points are the aircraft survival rates associated with specific levels of the factors listed at the bottom of the graph. The lines drawn between the points only serve to emphasize the change in aircraft survival between levels. The fact




Figure 12. Influence of Main Effects

that the lines are straight does not imply a linear relationship; in fact, no attempt is made to estimate survival rates at levels other than those stated in the research design. A more complete description of how to interpret ANOVA results is presented in chapter 6 of "Fundamental Concepts in the Design of Experiments," by Charles R. Hicks.

All the main effects behaved as expected. A great many more aircraft survived using road network 1 than road network 2, making the obvious point that the fighters'

chances of survival increase if they avoid areas where defendice sites are likely to be heavily concentrated. Saturating the defensive network by running the fighters through the network close together also increased their probability of survival. Decreasing ingress altitude from 1000 teet down to 500 feet helped the lighters somewhat, but going down to 200 feet increased the probability of survival much more dramatically. Finally, the fighters' probability of survival tended to be higher when the defenses were more tigatly grouped, since the probability of ilying over a portion of terrain relatively free of defenses was increased by concentrating the defenses into a small area. The effect of σ is influenced sharply, however, by its interaction with other factors. This will be explained in the next subsection.

<u>Two-Way</u> <u>Interactions</u>. The following two-way interactions were found to be statistically significant:

- 1. Road network vs. Aircraft altitude.
- Road network vs. g of defensive array.
- 3. Arrival rate vs. σ of defensive array.
- 4. Aircraft altitude vs. o of defensive array.

These interactions are discussed next.

The interaction between the road network and aircraft altitude is not an especially strong one. As is seen in the left hand portion of Figure 13, the advantage of road network one over road network two is somewhat less

pronounced when the aircraft is at an altitude of 250 feet than when the altitude is 500 or 1000 feet. Specifically, an average of 10.5 more aircraft survive with road network one—than—with road network two when the ingress altitude is 1000 feet, 10.05 more survive if the altitude is 500 feet, and 8.77 more survive if the altitude is 250 feet. Even though more aircraft survive at an altitude of 250 feet than at either of the other two altitudes, the increase in survival provided by road network one is less than at the higher altitudes. This relationship is




Figure 13. Interaction Between Road Network and Aircraft Altitude

explained by the fact that the number of aircraft that survive using road network one is much higher than the number that survive using road network two, regardless of altitude. This makes the benefit of going lower less aramatic.

The interaction between the road network and the standard deviation of the defensive array, shown in Figure 14, is an important one. With road network one, the tighters are a considerable distance from the primary LOC




Figure 14. Interaction Between Road Network and Standard Deviation of Defensive Array

during the major portion of the mission, and the number of aircraft that survive would be expected to decrease when the defenses are spread more widely across the belts. When road network two is used, on the other hand, the fighters are close to the LOC, and the number that survive would be expected to increase as the standard deviation is increased. Figure 14 shows that these two factors interact as expected. The right hand portion of this graph shows that, when road network one is used, survival rates increase as sigma is reduced, while when road network two is used, survival rates decrease as sigma is reduced.

Figure 15 shows that the degree to which defensive sites are spread out across the belts has virtually no effect on aircraft survivability when the defenses are saturated by incoming aircraft; note the nearly horizonal line associated with the exponential arrival rate on the right hand side of the graph. Tightening the defenses has a positive effect survivability when arrivals are too far apart to saturate the defenses, however, as shown by the upward sloping line associated with the 10 minute arrival interval. Because the aircraft enter in a narrow corridor, the first aircraft through the network will tie up most, if not all, of the guns within range, regardless of the density of the defenses near the corridor. As a result, relatively few defensive sites are able to shoot at subsequent aircraft




Figure 15. Interaction Between Aircraft Arrival Rate and Standard Deviation of Defensive Array

the the weapon sites are released. The effect of the standard deviation of the defensive array is thus nullified for a large number of the incoming aircraft when the defensive array is saturated. When the defenses are not saturated, on the other hand, the standard deviation of the defensive array influences the system in the same manner that it influenced it as a main effect.




Figure 16. Interaction Between Aircraft Altitude and Standard Deviation of the Defensive array

Figure 16 shows that survivability is higher at an ingress altitude of 250 feet than it is at an altitude of 500 or 1000 feet, regardless of the degree to which the defenses are spread out; note the upper line on e out hand side of the graph. At an ingress altitude of 250 feet, tightening the distribution of the defensive array tends to decrease aircraft survivability, while at 500 and 1000 feet, it tends to increase survivability. This concept is illustrated by the fact that the 250 foot line

has a downward slope, while the 500 and 1000 foot lines slope upward. Another interesting feature is that when the defenses are spread out, with sigma equal to 6.25 NM, survivability is clearly higher at 500 feet than at 1000 feet, while when they are more tightly clustered, with sigma equal to 3.0 NM, there is virtually no difference in survivability between the two altitudes. This concept is illustrated by the two lower lines in the figure; an average of two more aircraft survive at 500 feet than at 1000 feet when sigma is set at 6.25 NM, while the average survival rates are nearly equal with sigma set at 3.0 NM.

Five-Way ANOVA with Altitude Level Three Omitted.

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Because an altitude decrease from 500 feet down to 250 feet had a considerably larger effect on the model's output than a decrease from 1000 feet to 500 feet, a five-way ANOVA which looked only at simulation runs with ingress altitudes of 500 feet and 1000 feet was performed. Ingress altitude was still a statistically significant factor when only these levels were considered, but it was considerably less significant than it was when all three levels were included in the data base. Furthermore, the interaction between ingress altitude and the standard deviation of the defensive network, while significant, was less significant than it was when the altitude was considered at all three levels. interaction between the road network and aircraft altitude

became statistically insignificant.

cour-Way ANOVA with Signa Held Constant.

signal was a player in three of the four signalicant interactions in the five-way ANOVA, additional ANOVA runs were made with signa held constant at each of its two levels.

In the first run, sigma was held constant at level one (0.25 NM); that is, all observations in which sigma was set at level two (3.0 NM) were disregarded. This run provided some interesting information. The road network, aircraft arrival rate, and aircraft altitude remained statistically significant factors, and aircraft velocity remained statistically insignificant. None of the two-, three-, or four-way interactions, however, were significant. This implies that all the interactions of the variables were occurring when sigma equalled 3.0 (sites tightly bunched).

In the second run, sigma was held constant at level two (3.0 NM). The main effects were unchanged from the previous ANOVA runs. The following two-way interactions were statistically significant:

- 1. Road network vs. Aircraft arrival rate.
- Road network vs. Aircraft altitude.

None of the three- or four-way interactions were significant.

The interaction between the road network and aircraft altitude was explained in the discussion of the five-way ANOVA results. This interaction is more significant when sigma is set at 3.0 NM than when sigma is not held constant, while it is insignificant when sigma is set at 6.25 NM.

As shown on the left hand side of Figure 17, the advantage of saturating the defenses is less pronounced using road network one than when using road network two;




Figure 17. Interaction Between Road Network and Aircraft Arrival Rate (Sigma Held at 3.0 NM)

approximately one more aircraft survives by changing from a 10 minute interval to the exponential arrival rate with road network one, while approximately two more aircraft survive when the same change is made with road network This relationship is explained by the fact that the two. number of aircraft that survive using road network one is much higher than the number that survive using road network two, regardless of the aircraft arrival rate. This wakes the benefit of saturating the defenses less dramatic with road network one than with road network two. This interaction becomes 3 tically significant only when sigma is held constant at 3.0 NM because the number of aircraft that survive increases dramatically using a combination of network one and sigma equal to 3.0 NM, regardless of the levels of other factors.

Four-Way ANOVA with Airspeed Excluded

Because airspeed was found to be statistically insignificant in the five-way ANOVA runs, a four-way ANOVA was accomplished with airspeed excluded as a factor. The results were the same as the results of the original five-way ANOVA. The elimination of one factor, however, doubled the number of observations in each cell. The close agreement of the four-way ANOVA results and the five-way ANOVA results thus provided a high degree of confidence that five observations in each cell was adequate to achieve accurate results.

This chapter has explained the analysis of the data obtained in the experiment. The next chapter explains the testing performed to validate the model.

VI The Validation Process

Validation is the process of developing confidence in the model's ability to accurately draw inferences about the true behavior of the system. Shannon divides the validation process into three categories:

- Verification insuring that the model behaves as it was intended to behave.
- Validation testing the agreement between the behavior of the model and that of the real system.
- Problem analysis the drawing of statistically significant inferences from the data generated by the computer model (Ref 8:30).

The third aspect of the validation process, problem analysis, was discussed in detail in the previous chapter.

This chapter addresses the first two processes - verification and validation.

Verification

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Three categories of tests were performed to verify the internal consistency of the model. They are listed below:

- 1. Statistical testing to determine whether distributions used in the model behaved properly.
- Monitoring of activities and computations to verify that they performed as desired.
- 3. Testing the factors at their extremes to assure

that results were logical within the framework of the model.

The specific testing accomplished in the verification process is discussed below.

Aircraft Arrival Times. For runs specifying arrivals spaced 1) minutes apart, the arrival times at the first AAA belt were checked; all arrivals were spaced correctly. To check that the exponentially distributed arrivals behaved properly, a sample of 38 arrivals times was obtained from two consecutive runs of the model (20 aircraft arrivals per run with the first arrival at time zero). The 38 data points were analyzed using a Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Test. The hypotheses for this test are shown below:

- d_{ij} : The 38 arrival intervals are from an exponential (.5 minutes) distribution.
- $\hat{\mathbf{r}}_1\colon$ The arrival intervals are not from an exponential (.5 minutes) distribution.

the null hypothesis could not be rejected by this test, using an alpha of .05. This led to the conclusion that the arrival rates came from the desired distribution. The results of the test are shown in Appendix II.

Distribution of Defensive Sites. The first part of this analysis was to verify that none of the defensive sites fell outside the limits of -13.5 NM to +13.5 NM. After this was verified, two sample AAA belts, one with a standard deviation of 6.25 NM and the other with a standard deviation of 3.0 NM, were tested using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. For the AAA belt with a

standard deviation of 6.25 NM, the hypotheses for the test were as shown below:

 $\rm H_{\odot}:$ The AAA sites come from a normal distribution with a standard deviation of 6.25 NM.

H₁: The AAA sites do not come from a normal distribution with a standard deviation of 6.25 NM.

For the AAA belt with a standard deviation of 3.0 NM, the hypotheses for the test were the same, with the exception of replacing 5.25 with 3.0. In both cases, the null hypothesis could not be rejected using an alpha of .05. This led to the conclusion that the defensive sites were distributed as desired. Both tests are described in detail in Appendix iI.

Probabilities of Kill. This part of the verification process analyzed the activity of the model to determine at what point an aircraft could be picked up by a weapon system's tracking radar, and then compute an accurate probability of kill based on the aircraft's position at the time of intercept by the missile or bullets. All five weapon systems in the model were analyzed, and the results calculated by the model were found to be consistent with those calculated by hand. Two examples of the calculations in this part of the verification process are shown in Appendix I.

Tie-Up Times of Weapon Systems. The first step in this phase was to insure that only those SAMs having a probability of kill of .02 or above were allowed to shoot at an aircraft. After this was verified, the tie-up times

of the weapon systems were checked to insure that they rell within the correct range. Next, tied-up weapon sites were monitored to insure that they did not shoot at subsequent aircraft until after their scheduled release time. Finally, the weapon sites were monitored to verify that they actually released at the scheduled times. All of these concepts are illustrated by the sample computer output shown in Appendix J.

Testing the Model at its Extremes. During this phase of the verification process, the model was tested with certain factors set well beyond the limits studied in the experiment. All behaved as expected. When the aircraft velocity was set at 60 knots, for example, missile kills went up dramatically, when it was set at 3000 knots, no missile kills were recorded. When the aircraft altitude was set at zero, no missile kills and very few AAA kills were recorded. The model was not run with extremely high altitudes, because it is not designed to reliably handle them. When the saturation of the defensive array was increased by reducing the mean time of the exponential arrivals to al minutes, aircraft survival increased substantially. The opposite extreme is already tested in the experiment, since there is no saturation of the defenses with a 10 minute arrival interval.

Validation

The validation erfort centered primarily around establishing face validity. The primary vehicle in achieving this aim was a Turing test. The test consists of finding people and are experts in the system being modeled, presenting them with sets of input-output data from the real system and other sets of data from the model, and then asking them to differentiate between the two sets of data (Ref 8:28*). Because the system in the model has never been tested in the real world, the test was modified slightly. The experts were given sets of input data, and they were then asked to predict the results as the factors ranged over the levels considered in the computer model. Their predictions were then compared to computer generated results.

It should be reemphasized at this point that the survivability figures developed by the model are ordinal data; they are useful only for comparing the various alternatives evaluated and are not intended to be predictors of actual combat survival rates. Nevertheless, changes in various factors of the experiment should change the output (aircraft survival) in a logical manner.

when all the factors were set at levels which should have enhanced survivability the most, the model did in fact produce the second highest number of surviving aircraft of the 48 cells evaluated. Specifically, the levels were:

Airspeed = 540 Facts,
Altitude = 250 Feet,
Arrival rate = exponential (.5 minutes mean),
doad network 1, $\sigma = 3.0 \text{ Nm}.$

The results of 5 runs of 2) aircraft each were:

for a total of 98 of 100 aircraft surviving. The highest number of surviving aircraft (99) was attained in a run in which aircraft arrived at 10 minute intervals and all other factors were set as shown above.

When all factors were set at levels which should have reduced survivability the most, the model produced the lowest number of surviving aircraft of the 48 cells evaluated. These levels were:

Airspeed = 480 knots.

Altitude = 1000 feet.

Arrival rate = 10 minutes.

Road network 2.

σ = 3.0 NM.

the results of the 5 runs were:

for a total of only 3 aircraft surviving.

fire results discussed above illustrate the model's output at the extremes of the five factors. These results, coupled with more gradual changes in survivability as the factors are varied one at a time, are intuitively appealing.

To further substantiate the intuitive appeal of the model's results, Turing tests were conducted with five pilots and one navigator. All had extensive backgrounds in fighter aircraft. Three of the pilots had served tours in Central Europe and were intimately familiar with the terrain and threat array represented by the model. All six agreed that the model's output was reasonable.

Once the model was developed and validated and the results of the experiment collected and analyzed, the only steps remaining in the thesis were to draw conclusions from the results and make recommendations based on the conclusions. The conclusions and recommendations are presented in the next chapter.

VII Conclusions and Recommendations

The objective of this thesis, as stated in Chapter I, was to determine whether the increased capability of the lighter to fly lower and faster, provided by the LANTIRN FLIR, will improve significantly its survivability in the might interdiction role. The conclusions are as follows:

- The capability to increase airspeed does not significantly increase survivability.
- 2. A decrease in ingress altitude from 1000 to 500 feet will increase survivability to a minor degree.
- A further decrease in ingress altitude to 250 feet will significantly improve the fighter's survivability.

The results of the experiment also led to some conclusions which do not directly relate to the objectives of the thesis effort. These conclusions are as follows:

- The most important single factor in fighter survivability is the avoidance of heavy concentrations of anti-aircraft threats.
- Fighter survivability can be significantly enhanced by saturating the enemy defensive network.
- 3. The AAA is the single greatest threat to a fighter flying a night battlefield air interdiction mission, due primarily to the large number of them in the army area.
- 4. The SAM-D and SAM-C are also significant threats in this scenario.
- 5. The SAM-B and SAM-A have virtually no capability against the fighter in this scenario.

Based on the above conclusions, the following recommendations are made:

- 1. That every effort be made to develop a FLIR of high enough resolution to allow the fighter pilot to fly the mission at an altitude of 250 feet or below.
- 2. That tactics emphasize the avoidance of enemy detenses and the use of corridors to saturate the enemy defensive network.
- 3. That our ECH efforts concentrate on defeating the AAA, SAM-D, and SAM-C.

VIII Recommended Areas for Follow-On Study

Like most research efforts, this thesis was unable to cover all the aspects of the system studied or address all the questions that need to be asked. Some recommended areas for follow-on study of the night BAI survivability problem are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Conclusion one in the preceding chapter was that the capability to increase airspeed does not significantly increase survivability. This conclusion is only valid for the airspeeds studied in the experiment - 480 and 540 knots. Further study to determine a point at which airspeed does become significant would be worthwhile, especially in the study of survivability of aircraft incapable of the high speeds considered in this experiment.

A LAND LAND

Conclusions two and three stated that survivability is increased as altitude is decreased. This research effort, however, did not address the problem of increased risk of the aircraft impacting the ground while the pilot was attempting to fly at the lower altitudes. A study of the trade-off between the increased protection against enemy defenses and the increased risk of flying the aircraft into the ground at the lower altitudes would be worthwhile.

It should be noted that the model developed in this thesis can be easily adapted to analyze a variety of problems. It could, for instance, serve as a framework for analyzing various jamming systems against a typical Soviet air defense array. It could also be used to determine the impact of various routes of flight and degrees of saturation of the enemy defensive network in an attempt to develop improved fighter tactics. Both these areas were considered in the experiment, but they were not developed in depth. Furthermore, the model could serve as a framework upon which a model to study the night target acquisition process could be developed.

Finally, it should be noted that the validity of the output of the model might be improved by a more detailed treatment of several areas. Some suggestions are listed below:

- 1. The output of the jamming pod could be made directional rather than radiating uniformly in the hemisphere beneath the aircraft.
- 2. Features such as radar polarity and frequency agility could be treated.
- Enemy acquisition radars could be explicitely treated.
- A range of J/S ratios could be considered in modeling the lock-on process of the target tracking radars.
- 5. The elevation of the aircraft with respect to the radar could be considered in determining radar cross-sections. The model presently considers only the aspect of the aircraft in this computation.
- 6. Terrain could be modeled in more detail. The

model makes only one calculation to determine whether a given weapon site is blocked by terrain. It does not allow for the case in which an aircraft alternately passes behind terrain features and then comes back into the radar's view as time progresses.

7. A C3 structure between the acquisition radars and various radar-controlled weapon systems could be explicitely modeled.

The same of the sa

8. SAM and AAA sites could be given multiple shots at the aircraft if conditions appeared favorable.

Undoubtedly, many more details could be added to the model. but those listed above are the major ones. It is not possible to say at this time whether incorporation of any, or even all, of the details listed above would significantly improve the validity of the model's output. This can only be determined by actually adding the features and observing the results. The model in its present form, however, accomplishes the purpose for which it was designed with the necessary degree of accuracy.

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
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
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SLAM Network Diagram





Appendix B

SLAM Computer Model

In the model printed out below, road network one has been used and aircraft arrive at an exponential rate with a mean of .5 minutes. The road network can be changed by changing the input data on lines 260 and 270, while the arrival rate can be changed on line 4590. All other factors are changed with initialization cards placed prior to the simulate cards in lines 5430 through 6130 of the model.

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 300:
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                                             .5 (ABS(SAME(1.J)).GT.13.5) G0 T0 41
600= 42 CONTINUE
. .)=
                                             56 45 J=1+3
120=
                                             43(3) = RNGLOC(9)
€ 10= 46
                                         SAME(2,U) = RAURM(XX(3),XX(4),1)
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                                             IF (ABS(SAMB(2,3)).GT.10.5) GO TO 46
750- 45 CONTINUE
1669=L
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                                             30 53 I=1.3
190=
                                             III = ((*I) + 1)
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                                             BB 51 J=1.5
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                                             SAMC(I.J) = RNGRM(XX(3).XX(4).i)
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                                             IF(ABS(SAMC(I,U)).GT.10.5) G0 T0 52
 740: 51 CONTINUE
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                                             111 = E
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                                            (x(3) = RNGL (111)
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                                            DO +1 3=1.6
                                             SAMB(T+J) = RNGR#(XX(3)+XX(4)+1)
80M=62
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                                            IF (ABS(SAMB(I+J)).CT.10.5) GO TO 62
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          #81N1 +,"*********************
          PRINT * "AIRCRAFT VELOCITY = " VVEL " ALTITUBE = " XX (1)
1070=
          PRINT *."AIR RAFT ARRIVAL RATE = EXPON: .5 MINUTES)"
1363
393 x
          PRINT *>"ROAD NETWORK 1 "
1199=
          PRINT *. "STANBARD DEVIATION OF THE DEFENSIVE SITES = ", XX(4)
1118-
          PRINT *,"*********************
1110=
          RETURN
1138:0
1143=1
1150=0
        LOCK UP THE NUMBER OF SITES IN THE BELT AND COMPUTE THE
11:3=
        RANGE FROM THE AZE TO EACH SITE.
1:70=0
1180-2
          L = ATRIE(2)
1199=
          ATRIB(7) = 0.
1700=
          K = NAAA(L)
          1A = 1
1/10-
          GB TB 9
1.18-
1739=0
          IA = 2
1749=3
1250=
          L = ATRIB(5)
1268=
          K = MSAMC(L)
          CO TO 9
1278=
1:89=0
1799=4
          1A = 3
1300=
          L = ATRIE(4)
1010=
          k = NSAMD(L)
1320=
          GO TO 9
1330=0
1340=5
          IA = 4
1 359=
          L = ATRIB(6)
1 :68=
          K = NSAME(L)
1:70=
          GO TO 9
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        A = (X.1) + RNORM(0.:50.:1)
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        CALL PROBKIL
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          15 HALFHA .CE. 7.51 GO TO 8
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          59.22 142-11
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          15 .ALFha.GT.TERR(1)) GO TO 24
1502
          COLUMN F
1.1.4
          [E : [M-1
          FE - (1-DR(IB) - ALPHA)/(TERR(IB) | TERR(IM))
1.17
          F2 = 118 - 2. + FE1/10.
1780
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         IF (ERAND(1).LE.FG) GB TO 19
1-13-6
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        PERCH IF THE GUN IS BUSY
13500
          THE NEW (IA)
1.40:6
1850=
          IF (INP.EG.0) GO TU 10
          DO 18 THEIRINE
1 - .... =
: 70=
          IF (J.EG.HI(IK-L-IA)) GO 70 19
3-13
          CONTENUE
17:70=
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           n: 111.1A: = 0.
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           23(3) = 0.
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           NEG (IA) = NEGLICIA, - 1
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          PONTINUE
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           IF (NE(L.IA) .EQ. e. RETURN
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:100=0
        OF THE SITE OR OUN MEETS A MENINUM CRITERIA. TIE IT OP FOR "8"
         TIME UNITS.
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1110:1
7110=
           IF (AA(MM), EQ. 8) RETURN
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          INE = NB(L.IA)
1 78=
           DO 34 MEMM, INB
2160=
          C(1) = HI (M+L+IA)
           C(2) = L
1176=
7180=
          0(3) = 10
1190=
           98 31 NN=4,8
1100=
          ( (NN) = 0.
2219=31
          CONTINUE
2220=
          E = B(E(1))/60.
2230=
           CALL SCHOL (7,E.C)
          CONTINUE
2240=34
2258=0
7260=0
        TEST FOR A KILL. (ATRIE(7)=1 MEANS KILL, ATRIE(7)=0 MEANS NO KILL.)
2270-C
2289=
           DO 48 K=MM.INE
2290=
           IF (DRAND(1).LE.AA(K)) ATRIB(7)=1
2388=46
          CONTINUE
2313=
          RETURN
2320=0
233#=C
2340=0
        RELEASE THE SITE OR GUN TO FIRE AGAIN.
2350=C
7369=7
          L = ATRIB(2)
2370=
          IA = ATRIB(3)
1386=
          IHI = ATRIE(1)
2390=
          INB = NE(L.IA)
2499=
          DO 58 J=1 . INB
2410=
          JM = J
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            AA(1) = PK(1)
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            JJ = J+1
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            IF (PK(J).GE.PK(JJ)) GO TO 10
110=
            IF (PK(JJ).LE.AA(I)) G0 T0 10
1/20=
            HI(I.L.IA) = JJ
            AA(1) = PK(JJ)
2/30=
1149=10
            CONTINUE
53
            PR(HI(I+L+IA)) = 8.
1160=20
            CONTINUE
2/70=
            NE(L,IA) = NE(L,IA) + Z
 780=
            IF (IA.EQ.1) NB(L.IA) = NB(L.IA) + 3
j. 19-
            RETURN
17.63=
           END
27:00:0
27:20=0
34 =
            DUBROUTINE PROBKIL
. 40=
           COMMON/SCOMI/ATRIB(100):BD(100):DDL(100):BTNOW:II:MFA:MSTOP:NCLNR
1-56=
           *, NCRDR, NPRNT, NNRUN, NNSET, NTAPE, SS (100), SSL (100), TNEXT, TNON, XX (100)
i : 8=
           COMMON /ALL/ PK(25).HI(15.9.5).AA(25).NE(9.25).R.A.IA.IC.L.B(25)
1370=
           BIMENSION ASPECT (37.5) - SIGMA(37.3)
- B=
           DATA ((ASPECT(Ind)+J=1.5), I=1.37)/ 0. .3.80, 3.04, 3.82.5.79,
:890=
          + 5., 1.90, 2.10, 2.64, 4.37, 10., 1.88, 2.69, 3.39, 2.80,
1900=
          + 15., .84, 2.84, 3.58, 3.36, 20., 1.92, 2.44, 3.07, 2.48,
7918=
          + 25., 1.51, 2.68, 3.37, 3.55, 30., 1.27, 6.84, 8.61, 4.10,
1 170=
          * 35., .91, 5.01, 6.31, 1.96, 40., 1.41, 2.98, 3.76, 2.74,
. 430=
          + 45., 1.89, 3.87, 3.87, 4.68, 50., 1.35, 1.80, 2.26, 3.22,
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* 5.0 (1.25 c 1.0 + 2.34) (187 c 188 c 1.78 c 1.78) (2.21 c 2.24)
            1 1
        8 (87.) 1.4 (5.77) 2.00 4.04 (10.) 3.41 5.48 (10.) 6.70
        4.5-
        * 1.5. + 1.3 + 1. . + 1.61 + 1.62 + 136. + 1.84 + 1.-4 + 1.54 + 3.56 +
        1.
 . A-
        * 0.000 0.740 0.750 0.050 7 PAR 100.0 0.070 7.140 2.700 0.460
 323
 18.72
        * 40 - 1 1.17 + 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 A. 1.00 A. 1.00 - 1.06.
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        + 275. + 1.128. 1.55. 1.88.10 +2. 188. + 1.22. 5.86. 7.51.12.73/
 1.1.
        1- 4 (-1784 1. 1.) 10 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 2. 20. 8.20.
ع ابر درو
ت ابر درو
        + 4.75, .40, 6.74, 4.22, 2.55, 1.90,
A &:
        * 1.70, 3.83, 3.40, 4.00, 1.70, .85,
liga-
        ÷ 2.75,
                1.50. 3.75, 1.70, 10.65, 5.20,
1119=
        * 1.65, 7.95, 1.24, 2.15, 2.45, 1.70,
100
        a 4,7g,
                1.70, 6.35, 1.75,
                                 .95, 3.10,
1.10.
                5.65. 1.04. -4.80. -.95. 1.00.
149=
        .40₁
                 .65,
                      ..... 9..... 8.45, 8.19,
:150-
        + 18.75, 14.55, 15.45, 13.98, 16.35, 16.70,
3168=
        * 16.38, 16.88, 16.88, 25.85, 24.98, 24.25,
317#=
        * 28.88, 19.95, 19.23, 17.88, 15.75, 16.58,
318#=
        ¥ 7.63, 9.28, 5.83, 9.88, 8.73, 9.50;
3196:
        4 1.75, 3.65, 6.28, -.75, 2.33, 7.85,
3.99=
        4 -. 23, 3.13, 4.28, -2.33, 3.63, 3.48,
32.8≈
          .08, -1.08, 4.35, -1.28, -2.68, 3.90,
        4 1.98.
3220=
                .56, 5.86, 2.75, .55, 5.23,
36:
        4 6.55, .43, 6.83, .56, .58, 2.95,
        4 .55, 8.38, 4.73, 4.15, 8.53, 9.93,
3249=
.350=
        4 4.63, 3.85, 10.59, .98, 9.48, 15.05/
3268=0
3. Ø=
        GO TO (1,2,3,4,5) IA
3280=0
       AAA
3290=0
        IF AIRCRAFT IS OUT OF RANGE, SET PK(IC) = 0.
3300=1
        IF (R.GT.1.35) GO TO 99
3318=0
        2 C JINK FOR FIRST MINUTE AFTER FEBA PENETRATION, 1.3 C
3320=0
        AFTER THAT.
3330=
        6 = 1.5
334#=
        TIME = TNOW - ATRIB(1)
         IF (TIME.LE.1.) G = 2.
3 50=
3368=
         IF (TIME.GT.3.) G = 3.
3378=C
       COMPUTE INTERCEPT RANCE IN THOUSANDS OF FEET.
338#=
        X = E.Z
3396=
         IF ( R.LE..954) X = (R+6.08/.7071)
3486=
         IF (R.LE..3488) X = 3.#
3410-C COMPUTE BULLET VELOCITY AT INTERCEPT AND BULLET TIME OF FLIGHT
3420=
        VF = 3050.4EXP(-.1513+X)
3400=
        TOF = (6601.76/VF)-2.1645
3446=C
      COMPUTE SINGLE SHOT PK.
3450=
        DENOM = 6.2832+(128.+X)++2.) + 55.65
```

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- Service - Took Co. (AMM) Proc. 12、140.6 Top Page in <u>短機</u>能
                                WHERE I I THE STATE OF THE
                                  THE STATE OF THE S
      4.00
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                                  1. 1. K. S. W. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 19
                                    ng - 1
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        ~ y :
                               4.6
                                   The second of the second
         3.1
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       1.42
                                  (-\infty, 1, \dots, 1, -\infty) \in \mathbb{A}^{n+1}
    e 11
                                RETURN.
                                   F-1(5) - .0
        .
    2 4 d 2
                                (\operatorname{id}^{-1}) \cdot n X
    . . .
                               . W 48.6 6.1° ≥ 29 th 4
    4/8-
                              956. = :JIV3
      ψź
                              15 (XX(L) L 1.0.124) PK(E) = .025
  3.32
 , £98=v
                        IF (R.GT.1.1 .AND. R.LE.2.5) 60 TO 7
 3780=
                                Q0 18 99
 ់រដ្ឋ∯÷់
                               14A - 5
 97722
                               SM = 3.53
 1.3=
                               GO TO 18
 1740-0
                           _ - " - B
 1753:4
                             FF (A.EE. 230.1 G) TO 91
    ~ (J# =
                                IF (R.LE.4.3) G0 T0 99
                               IAA = 3
 1770=
                               TL = UNFRM(2..4..1)
 5750÷
 7.9:
                             NH = 2,44
 10 10 E
                                GO TO 18
35 (1-1)
                        347.4
 .c. 8=5
                             - IF (A.LE.1000,1 50 TO 99
38.1Ø=
                              IF (R.LE.2.7 .OR. R.GE.13.4) GO TO 59
                               1AA = 2
 - 19:
r, 0 =
                                TL = 4.
 Also
                               34 = 5.3
_ - ( ) = (
                               30 TO 1€
.30811
  898:
                           WITHOUTE THE LUDGE WHEAD ANGLE
   1,14.5
  310-10
                         □ D 11 157519
      ,4 ÷
                              186 = 10 - 1
                               Se = R/SIMB(ASPECT(IBB+1))
      1
  , 4 st =
                              OF (ASPECTAIBE-IAA).LT.RE) OF TO 12
34,7411
                         CONTINUE
15-7-12-12
                              110 = 188 + 1
 470
                               R4 = (ASPECT(IBB, IAA) #COSD(ASPECT(IBB, I))) - (ASPECT(IBB, IAA)
```

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Contraction of Contract Confederate Contract Contract (Contract Contract Co
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1 (18) (18) (18) (18)
1 (18) (18) (18) (18) (18)
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      2.12.
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                                                                                      A. 2 F. 4 185...
     1.5
     3 30
                                                                                    - 3(2) = (A 36(8)(8)) + 10.
     41,000
     4190-
                                                                                7 77 (01,52), 27(14,35), 14
    1 Age 1
    1.18:72
                                                                                - 67- = 2. ★ FDSM - 53.4 - BIGMA(JA(2))
    RJ = 10.±1(RJS/10.)
    1. 0
                                                                                    FEF = SGR107.1F-7#RJ#RL##Z, + 2.2E+3#RJ +58.) #3.28084
                                                                                    H = (8. ./(EF)**2.
    4 46.
    1 13=
                                                                                     ACCE 2.1. 6 点键
    4 8:
                                                                                      8:10)= T1 + 30. + UNF-*(15..00..1)
  4 /2=
                                                                                    RETURN
  4.500
                                                                   3 4 % B
  4.90=3. RUC = 1. + RODM - 52.4 - E1CMA(JA/3)
  4 7/14
                                                                                    RJ = 10.++(R/5/10.)
  1 (d =
                                                                                    SEP = SGR1:3.25E-7+RJ+R.++2. + 1.89E+1+RJ + 25.1+3.28084
  1.73
                                                                                     H = (77.7650) +42.
  4 30=
                                                                                    FK(IO) = 1. - .5**H
  4 340=
                                                                                    E(IC) = T1 + 10. + UNFRM(8., 20., 1)
  4350=31 RETURN
  1 153 =
                                                                   94≯ B
  4370: 4 RUS = 2.4688M 15.4 - 516MA(JA,2)
  4 180 =
                                                                                    AU = 18.44 in 15/18.1
  4773:
                                                                                  EEF = SQRT(5,AIF 64RJ4RL442, + 2.5E+34RJ + 232.) + 2.28884
  2 30€=
                                                                                    ы : (143. МЕЗОНО.
  44100
                                                                                  Pk(IC) = 1. - .5***
  4420=
                                                                                  E(IC)= TI + 15. + UNFRM(10.,22..1)
4430=
                                                                                RETURN
4 (40 = [
                                                           SAM A
1:50=25
                                                                              RUS = 2. + ROBM - 46.2 - SIGMA(JA:1)
4148=
                                                                                R1 = 18.44 (RUS/18.)
1170.
                                                                                SEP = SERT:2.52E-5#RU#RL##2. + 9.61E+3#RU#671.)#3.78084
44.73=
                                                                                H = (185,70EF1##2.
4.41
                                                                             FK(ID) = 1. - .S###
```

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         4^{k_0}(x,\mathbf{v}) \neq
         But Burn to Burn
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              and the second
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        A Commence
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        PROFESSION ASSESSMENT OF A CONTRACT ASSESSMENT
        4 - 1 3
                                   m. Takka, I., cammi
        1.05 to
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     1 1-
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     1 19:
                                  ACTORNICE COLEGIZATIONS
     1772
                                 ACT .. AT-1842 .10.0.8181
    4 1 25 2
                                ACT :: ATR 1/21, 21, 21, 21, 21, 21, 21, 21
    4790=£1.
                                AUSIGN:A PIB(2):2.;
    $393z
                                ACTIXXCO F.SIGAAA;
    4:18:
    42.3.54
                                45510N,AFF1804 =1.,ATR18:53=1.1
   $ 7.75
                               ACTORX(LOTISON ABO)
   दे , यस = SAMC
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   4-50=
                               ACTOMATES TO FG. 100 ACT
  4-13.
                               ACTIONATE IN STREET, AME:
  170
                               ACT. . . AAAA!
  4 PERSONE EVENTIANTS
  \xi \in (A_1)
                              ACTIVATE DE COURGE LINSAPE
  4 - 34=
                              ACT+ATRIE(4).(gm.gt;
 47.92
                             ACTIONALL
 3:
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                             ASSIGNIATRIBICIE4..ATRIESSI=2.1
 4 /40 =
                             ACT.XXCZ .... SAMC:
                            ASSI NIATRIET =5. (ATRIE ) =151
 1358-86
4 64=
                            ACT:XX(2) +1, ... AMB:
4970=SAME EVENTISITE
. Ø=
                            ACT .. ATE .. L (7) . EQ. 1 .. CAE;
4998:
                           A01+++4441
13:00:07
                           AS JIGN (ATRIBUZDER GATRIPUSDED),
* A1#=
                           ACTAIX (2142.03AME)
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Barrell Butter Carry
          4 (2011) 17,665年1
 2 .
          CA CONTRACTS LINE TARREST 48 C.
          ALTON BLOCKAMER
. 4 . . .
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       8 ASS ASS BUREAU
           a first of the SAMet
   A
      Carlotte St. St.
 3.8
          ACT ---- 11 77.EG.14 241
 100
          4.100 4. (3).Eu.leg. (4)
           1.0
          A. S. G. ... 15 (2) 9.1
           A To 1 . 111, ... 4441
 150 by ANS Combiblion 2.1
100
          -607.x+0[.+] .,,$AMA;
1178 6
TOO THE AS CONTAIN THE WAS A
1 - 761
           EDITION OF TOTAL SHAVIVEL!
1663
           TERM!
1.12-
5228=KAAA ASSIGN:XX(6)=XX(8)+1.;
           COLLEGIA STAGA KILLS!
1. 18
4.4
           5250=KBAC ASSIGN:XX(11)=XX(11)+1.;
5260
           COLOTIXX:11);SAM ( KILLS)
5270=
           ACTIONALLI
5280- (148 ASSISN: xx 110) = XX (10:+1.;
           COLCT:XX:18" SAM D RILLS;
5.46
5.00:
           ACT ... the
5'10-KSAF ASSIGN: XX (12) +1.;
3.76
           COLCIATEGIA - SAM E MILLS!
C-21/9-
           ACT+++KIL++
5340=KSAA ASSIGN: XX(3)=XX(9:+1.;
535#=
           COLCT+XX(7)+SAM A KILLST
5360=
           ACTIONNELLE
5370-1
5389=KIL_ ASSIGN: XX:7)=XX(7)+1.1
5798-
           COECTATA PRATOTAL PILLEST
5498=
          TERM;
410=
          ENDNET:
5420=INIT.G. C
5428=INTLE:XX(2)-.125:XX(14)-.25:XX.1)=1888.:XX(4)-6.25:
5440=SIMULATE;
5450=CIMBLATE;
5468= IPHLATET
5470-SIMBLATER
5480=SIMULATE:
5490=INT(C+ XX(2)=,11111111111111
5500=\IMULATER
5510 CIMULATE:
5520=SIMULATE;
5530=SIMULATER
```

1

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* 45 L
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      8-2-3
engline (and the Physical
       Service CAlti
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         Jackson City
  3 - 12 - 27 ALL
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        3.77% WE
   · AND CASE
   5 (#= | Vict + xx (1) = 500 . i
   1, 40 - MILATTI
   510 CMREATER
    Sige Migalei
   5:73=91MACATE;
   5 BORREST BLATER
   5 19N=INTO 6 x X (4) =3.81
   E Weislauffei
    5 (a=SIMULATE)
   5. 3g=ClouLATE;
    5: 30-CIMULATE;
    5. 4g: SIMULATE!
    5. 50=10.00.XX(1)=1000.
    5. SØ=> MOLATEV
    5 178=EINULATER
    t sørnimulate:
    5-00=CIMBLATER
    S. HE-CIMILATE:
    5.10=157(C+XX(Z)=.1111111111111111
     SOZDERSIMULATED
     5. Jan MULATE;
     5.74@=ClMRLATEF
     5/58-5/MULATE:
     SUBJECT IMULATED
      5070-12718:XX(1)=500.1
      * ##SIMULATE!
      5.40= MULATET
      & 20 SIMULATE!
      6-18-SIMILATES
      - ZØ=JIMULATE;
      . 19=1NTLC.XX(1)=250.;
      1 143- IMULATET
      4.50=51MBLATE;
```

A TO TOLATE!

A TOLATE |

A

The sample output shown below is from the first run of the model (all factors at level one):

1.10=		\$ (LAM SUN	MARY RE	PORT	
6320=						
€. 3 0 =						
S. 40=		SIMULATION PRO	JECT THESIS NE	TWORK	BY LEEK AND	SCHMITT
675 0 +						
ხ <i>ა</i> 5 % =		DATE 11/20/198	i		RUN NUMBER	1 OF 6#
5 /g=						
h.j.j 0 =						
h y jó =		CURRENT TIME	.2199E+02			
გ4 1 % =		STATISTICAL AR	RAYS CLEARED A	T TIME 0.		
84195						
04 20=						
6430=						
в4 46 =		**STATISTICS F	ûR VARIABLES B	ASED ON OBSERV	ATION**	
કુંક, શું ≎						
645 0 ∓	HEAN	STANDARD	COEFF. OF	MINIMUM	MUMIKAM	NUMBER OF
8/70=	VALUE	DEVIATION	VARIATION	VALUE	VALUE	OBSERVATIONS
ည် မ ်း ဖြ င						_
6490: TOTAL SURVIVED	.550 9E+0 1	3#28 E+#1	.5505E+00	.1000E+01	.1000E+02	16
F100= AAA HILLS	.3000E+01	.1581 E+81	.527 0E+A0	.1030E+01	.5000E+01	5
8510= SAM C KILLS		NO VALUES	RECORDED			
RIFO: SAN D KILLS	.5000E+01	.1581E+ 6 1	.527#E+##	.1000E+61	.5000E+01	5
ESDØ= SAM B KEELS		NÚ VALUES				
E:40= SAM A KILLS		NO VALUES				
S HE TOTAL KILLS	.550 6E+0 1	.3028E+ 0 1	.55 85E+88	.1 000 E+01	.1000E+02	16

Appendix C

RANGES Computer Program

This program computes the maximum range at which each of the defensive systems in the model can see the fighter, assuming the J/S ratio must be 20 or less for the fighter to be seen. The input data for the program, Tape 1, are the radar cross-sections given in Table V. The output of the program is shown in Table VI.

```
PROGRAM RANGES (INPUT DUTPUT TAPE1 TAPE2)
100=
119=1
120=0
 130=
           DIMENSION RNG(37,5), XSCTN(37,4)
 140=
           DATA RNG. XSCTN/333#0./
 150=0
 168=1
 170= 100 FORMAT(F4.0+3F7.2)
 180: 150 FORMAT(////-21x-"DETECTION RANGE (IN NM)")
 190= 200 FORMAT(//.3X:"ASPECT (DEGREES)".5X:"AAA".5X:"SAM-A".5X:
          *"SAM-B",5X,"SAM-C",5X,"SAM-D",/)
 210= 250 FORMAT (9X,F4.0,8X,F6.2,3X,4(F6.2,4X))
 220=0
 230=0
 240=C READ ASPECT ANGLE AND ASSOCIATED RADAR CROSS-SECTIONS.
           DO 10 I=1+37
 250=
           READ (1:198) (XSCTN(I:J):J=1:4)
 250=
           CONTINUE
 270 = 10
 286=0
 298=[
 366=
           00 20 1=1.37
 310=0
 320=C COMPUTE AAA DETECTION RANGE.
 336=
           DBAAA = 34.3 + (.5 # XSCTN(I:4))
 340=
           RNG(1+1) = (10. ++ (DBAAA/10.))/1852.
 350=0
 360=C COMPUTE SAM-A DETECTION RANGE.
 37#=
           DBSAMA = 33.1 + (.5 * XSETN(I,2))
 360=
           RNG(I,2) = (10.4 + (DBSAMA/10.))/1852.
```

```
9.1
ANNUAL CHARLOSE AM IN DESECTION NAMES.
4.7
          Becadb = 5.7 + (.5 * (5) N(1) (3)
4.1)-
          #NG(1) 1 (19. ** (86,486/16.7)/1651.
4 NO 4
444.,
      CONFORE SAM & DESCRIPTION HANGE.
4 9:
         CBSAM: = 16.7 + (.5 + $501N(1))
- 3
          68612141 116. ** (DBSHA) /16.77-1852.
4 95 23
450 C - MPBIE SAM-B DETECTION RANGE.
49.00
         DESAME = 36.1 + 1.5 * XULTN(1,4))
1 Agr
          RNG(1+5) - (10. ## (UBSAMD/10.))/1852.
1999 Le CONTINUE
523
500
្នំ4ស់ន
         FRINT 150
550
          PRINT Led
1.50
          DU 30 1-1-57
570=
          FRINT 150,XSCTN(1+1)+(RNG(1+3)+3=1+5)
530=
          WRITE (2:250) XSCTN(1:1):(RNG(1:J):J=1:5)
990= 39
        CONTINUE
600=C
610×1
628=
          STOP
630=
          END
```

Appendix D


Defensive Arrays

The defensive array shown below was computed using road network two and a standard deviation of 6.25 NM. The locations of the AAA sites in belt five of this output were used in the statistical testing described in Appendix H.

```
DEFENDIVE ARRAY
54.3=
9470=
347,3-
9490=
1500
       BEL! 1
9519-
95,70=
           AAA
9508:
         4.76 -8.31 -2.24 -1.13 4.74 -12.21 -8.69 6.15 4.25 12.83 -8.42 1.94 -2.42 7.05 8.57 -1.10 -9.01 -9.39 4.71 .76
1,54@=
955#=
         -5.29 3.19 -.56 5.80 -.65
5588=
ÿ=79×
9589=
959#=
        BELT 2
5.38=
9610=
9670:
           AAA
16 3
        -8.82 2.98 -6.78 1.89 -1.14 2.80 -4.68 7.84 -2.63 -8.99
9840=
        -1.75 7.88 -9.11 5.45 0.41 4.44 -2.1. 9.47 -1.30 -7.12
1658
       -10.24 -1.96 9.87 -1.05 3.95
9660=
```

```
٠.
          The state of the state of the state of
           1.3
        -1.7 (1.87 (1.86 -.42 -.79 -7.48 -.14 3.15 6.15 9.16 17... .32 -(5.28 -12.32 1.61 1.28 -11.93 -1.58 9.69 6.39 4. .99 (0.88 4.86 2.8)
1.00
yf -
 _ (باي
5 1 A
        10.1
 3
. . . . . . .
ែរជំម្រះ
           â-sa
 -53:
          7. 6 5.16 4.78 -10.15 -2.98 4.24 -5.82 1.60 7.61 -11.74 1.44 1.13 1.32 .44 -1.66 1.52 9.11 -2.56 -4.17 -11.12
 123-
 .70
: 3:
- #:
          -1.17 -11.16 13.13 8.52 -4.00
           1 7.35
. .
: 6. 3:
-3.47 -6.30 -3.79
. 340-
€350=
        EEUT E
ः बहुजी :
1.176:
           5A4-8
11 10
1.3.3:
           9.66 -1.45 1.47
1. 1.
100
, y:
           AAA
1130=
           4.64 -2.15 3.26 -5.34 8.11 -2.57 -8.80
40=
1 12 32
```

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4...
. . .
. . . .
            1.62 4 6.64 (16.57 1.71 7.55 42.30
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 t 1.
          ,48 E
1 42
          7.51 -4. 4 -1.15 .... 0 -2.74 -6.71
 1000
           A A T
 6308 -
.379±
          -0.18 -4.53 4.87 1.19 7.37 .46 4.99
17.55
 ; <u>,</u> , <u>,</u> , <u>,</u> , <u>,</u>
(407°
44162
        BE1.7 9
 04.00=
£452=
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           94M-D
 €45Ø=
          -.98 -5.88 4.71
646B=
7-70=
$48£=
           AAA
@493=
          -3.14 4.67 -9.69 -.80 -5.96 -4.66 -10.57
0500 =
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9768=
            SAM-A
£570=
        -11.37 -.53
6586=
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श्रीतंत्रज्ञे =
0610-
6570=
        BELT 11
663Ø=
          SAM-A
Ø6,49=
€650=
8648=
         -8.15
067B=
6560=
6398=
6760=
       TARGET AREA
61:8=
9729=
           AAA
3720=
6748=
           .29
```



The defensive array shown below was computed using road network two and a standard deviation of 3.0 NM. The locations of the AAA sites in belt four of this outnut were used in part of the statistical testine described in Appendix N.


```
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          .....
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1.270
          ..b -1.39 2.4. -2.98 1.15 -3.31 -.42 -.79 -.12 2.25
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         -1.12 -.79 1.81 2.55 3.04 1.17 -1.63 -3.67 .36 -1.83 -2.45 -.69 -3.50 1.75 -.15
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     -.82 -.93 -.77 -1.81 -1.62 -1.01 5.91
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7390=
7-88=
      -1.83
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```




The following defensive array is for road network one and a standard deviation of $6.25\ \mathrm{NA}_{\odot}$

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1650=
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 818=
9826=
        BELT 4
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· . #=
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           AAA
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          9.96 -3.23 7.12 15.06 9.69 4.84 12.76 4.82 -1.35 5.82
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         10.04 2.98 10.48 -2.34 5.36 10.03 10.72 9.24 7.14 10.32
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       A.99 3.64 9.68 2.58 12.92 2.78 6.28
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0170 =
6130
        BELT 7
#150=
6200=
          SAM-0
$218=
27.29=
1.30=
        2.97 10.64
€240=
          AAA
0250=
6.60=
        17.48 9.42 5.68 4.39 8.85 10.56 4.81
₽ 73=
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        BET1 8
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6320=
4138=
         SAM-B
9349=
         J.74 18.97 7.87 12.92 18.86 7.98
€35∰÷
$368=
€370=
          AAA
8 . ∟8 =
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16-12
27, 3 =
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6712:
1726:
2713:
        TARGET AREA
          AAA
६३५%
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40 72
```




the following detensive array is for road network one and a standard deviation of 3.0 $\ensuremath{\mathrm{NM}_{\odot}}$

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1.61 9.91 12.77 7.4 1.44 9.15 2.44 7.19 12.55 12.58
44 9.55 1.48 11.2 8.14
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          SAM-C
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       12.76 11.24
5460=
5.473=
          AAA
548Ø=
5498=
         12.41 9.28 11.83 7.62 11.49 11.70 12.56
5500=
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5520=
5513= BELT 8
5540=
5550=
          SAM-B
5560=
5570=
        7.89 8.21 7.77 9.94 13.94 12.21
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         9.78 4.98 11.11 3.13 3.67 7.64 9.58
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5.450=
         AAA
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Appendix F

Five-Nay ANOVA

the SPSS program for the five-way ANOVA is listed below, alony with the data, which consists of the results of all 240 simulation runs. The first five entries on each data line are the levels at which the LOC network, aircraft arrival rate, aircraft velocity, aircraft altitude, and standard deviation of the defensive array were tested. The sixth entry is the number of aircraft that survived.

1-0=RJM NAME AIRCSAFT SURVIVAL

118-VARIABLE LIST BET, RATE, VEL, ALT, SIGNA, SURVIVAL

120=N OF CASES 240 130=1NPUT MEDIUM CARD 140=1NPUT FORMAT FREEFIELD

150-ANDVA SURVIVAL BY NET-RATE-VEL(1-2)-ALT(1-3)-SIGMA(1-2)

160=STATESTICS ALL 170=READ INPUT BATA

120=1 1 1 1 1 16 390=1 1 2 3 1 14 196=1 1 1 1 1 12 340=1 1 2 3 1 16 200=1 1 1 1 1 1 12 0.6=1 1 2 3 1 17 218=1 1 1 1 1 12 368=1 1 2 3 1 18 220=1 1 1 1 1 17 379=1 1 2 3 1 14 230=1 1 2 1 1 13 380=1 1 1 3 1 16 240=1 1 2 1 1 12 598=1 1 1 3 1 15 250=1 1 2 1 1 11 400=1 1 1 3 1 17 268=1 1 2 1 1 16 410=1 1 1 3 1 15 428=1 1 1 3 1 19 276=1 1 2 1 1 13 288=1 1 2 2 1 19 43#=1 1 1 2 1 13 446=1 1 1 2 1 16 296=1 1 2 2 1 11 458=1 1 1 2 1 14 300=1 1 2 2 1 15 469=1 1 1 2 1 12 310=1 1 2 2 1 14 470=1 1 1 2 1 17 320=1 1 2 2 1 12

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700=1 1 _ 3 2 19	12:40=1 2 2 2 2 2 18
718-1 1 2 3 2 20	1246=1 2 2 2 2 18
71e=1 1 2 3 2 20	1200=1 2 2 2 2 17
730=1 1 1 3 2 20	1769=1 2 2 2 2 2 18
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760=1 1 1 3 2 17	1790=1 2 2 3 2 20
7/0=1 1 1 3 2 20	1366=1 2 2 3 2 26
780=1 2 1 1 1 3	1 1 20=1 2 2 3 2 20
796=1 2 1 1 1 8	1320=1 2 2 3 2 19
800=1 2 1 1 1 12	1330=1 2 1 3 2 19
810=1 2 1 1 1 11	1340=1 2 1 3 2 17
820=1 2 1 1 1 12	1350=1 2 1 3 2 20
830-1 2 2 1 1 10	1366=1 2 1 3 2 20
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87 0 =1 2 2 1 1 5	1430=2 1 1 1 1 6
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586-1 2 2 2 1 12	1490=2 1 2 1 1 6
918:1 2 2 2 1 12	1449=2 1 2 1 1 5
928=1 2 2 2 1 16	1450=2 1 2 1 1 7
930=1 2 2 3 1 19	1450=2 1 2 1 1 10
948=1 2 2 3 1 19	1476=2 1 2 1 1 10
950=1 2 2 3 1 16	1436=1 1 2 2 1 8
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96#=1 2 1 3 1 13	1510=2 1 2 2 1 13 1520=2 1 2 2 1 15
970=1 2 1 3 1 20	1530=2 1 2 3 1 13
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2340=2	2	1	1	2	g
2350=2	2	1	1	2	1
2360=2	2	1	ı	2	i
2370=2	Z	1	1	2	3
2580=2	2	2	I	2	3
237 8 =2	4	2	i	4	2
2490=2	7	2	1	2	2
2410=2	2	2	1	2	2
2420=2	2	2	1	2	4
2430=2			7	4	3
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2580=2	2	7	3	2	6 2 5
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2520=2	2	7	3	2	5
2530=2	?	1	3	2	2 5 2 3
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to overall results of the ANOVA are given below. Statistically significant main effects and interactions are underlined.

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6916=	NET			5733.637	1	5733.637	162.949	. 661
6926=	RATE			352.837	1	352.837		.601
093 0 =	VEL			16.664	1	15.464		.167
6946=	ALT			516. 49 8	2	258.264	49.675	.661
9 95 9 =	SICHA			57.637	1	57.437	18.973	. 661
6 } 6 9 =								
#97 # =	2-WAY INTE	RACTIONS		1828.425	14	136.662	25.126	.661
#98#=	NET	RATE		13.538	1	13.538	2.644	.168
9999 =	NET	VEL		.937	1	.937	.186	.672
1000=	NET	ALT		32.925		16.612	3.681	.648
1616=	NET	SICHA		1565.784	1	1565.764		.001
1020=	RATE	VEL		1.294		1.264		
1636=	RATE	ALT		6.475		3.238		.537
1649=	RATE	SICMA		53.264		53.264		.662
1950=	VEL	ALT		12.158	_	6.979		.313
1865=	VEL	SICHA		.584		.594		.756
1676=	ALT	SICMA		142.675	2	71.337	13.724	.661
1986=								
	3-WAY INTE			52.133		3,258		.865
1166=	NET	RATE	VEL	4.537		4.537		.351
1119=	NET	RATE	ALT	14.725		7.363		.245
1126=	NET	RATE	SIGMA	2.694		2.694		.48#
113#=	NET	VEL	ALT	1.675		.837		.851
1146=	NET	VEL	SICMA	2.294		2.264		
1150=	NET	ALT	SICHA	1.158		.579		.895
1169=	RATE	VEL	ALT	5.858		2.929		.578
117#=	RATE	VEL	SICNA	1.564		1.594		
1189=	RATE	ALT	SICMA	15.448		7.544		
1196=	VEL	ALT	SIGNA	2.858	2	1.429	.275	.76

1210=	4-WAY INTE	RACTIONS		45.338	9	5.#38	.969	.467
1220=	NET	RATE	VEL	25.675	2	12.838	2.476	.# 87
1230=		ALT						
124#=	NET	RATE	VEL	.937	t	.937	.189	.672
1250=		SICMA						
1269=	NET	RATE	ALT	1.458	2	.529	.192	.9 € 3
1270=		SIGNA						
1280=	NET	VEL	AL T	3.198	2	1.554	.299	.742
129 6 =		SIGMA						
1366=	RATE	VEL	ALT	14.558	2	7.279	1.498	.249
1310=		SICMA						
1329=					_			
	5-WAY INTE			3.775	2	1.887	.363	.696
	LAIRCRAFT S	URVIVAL						
1356=								
136#=	NET	RATE	VEL	3.775	2	1.888	.363	.696
137#=		ALT	SIGNA					
138#=								
	EXPLAINED			8598.996	47	182.957	35.1 98	.## i
1466=								
	RESIDUAL			998.666	192	5.198		
1420=								
1430=	TOTAL			9596.996	239	49.155		

Gell means of the main effects and statistically significant interactions are given below. This data is traphed in Figures 12 through 16.

```
478: * * * * * * * * * * * CELL MEANS * * * * * * * * * * * *
486=
              SURVIVAL
496=
           BY NET
500=
              RATE
516=
              VEL
              ALT
520=
53#=
             SIGMA
550=
560=
570: TOTAL POPULATION
58#=
590=
     11.66
699= ( 249)
619=
6?#=
€3Ø= NET
649=
        1
              2
659=
669= 15.89
             6.12
676= ( 120) ( 120)
68#=
69#=
799= RATE
716=
        1
729=
     12.22
73#=
             9.79
748= ( 128) ( 128)
75#=
76#=
770= VEL
78#=
        1
798=
     19.86
            11.21
866=
816= ( 126) ( 126)
82#=
83#=
84# ALT
               2
                        3
856=
        1
860=
876=
       9.55
             18.45
880= ( 80) ( 80) ( 80)
89#=
966=
91#= SICMA
926=
        1
               2
930=
946=
    1#.52
            11.49
950= ( 126) ( 126)
```

.

۴.

1740=	A	LT				
1250-			1		2	3
1,60= NET						
1276=	1	14.80		15.47		17.49
1. ⊲@=		(49)	(49)	(40)
1/9#=						
1 399 -	2	4.30		5.42		8.63
1316=		(49)	(46)	(46)
1 :20=						
1336=						
1340=						
1 350 =	S	IGMA				
1 60=		1		2		
1370= NET						
138#=	1	12.85		18.93		
1 70=		(68)	(6 5)		
1499=						
1416=	2	8.18		4.65		
1420=		(68)	(6#)		
143#=						
1449=						
1716=	S	ICMA				
1720=		1		2		
173#= PATE		-		_		
1746=	1	12.20		12.23		
1750=			(_		
1768=			•	ν.		
1776=	2	8.83		16.75		
1786=		(60)	(
		. 557	,	00,		
2646=	S	IGMA				
2050=		1		2		
206 6 = ALT						
2 076 =	1	8.15		11.66		
248 6 =		(49)	(46}		
2098=						
2166=	2	16.66		16.96		
2119=	((4#)	(46)		

When altitude level 3 was omitted, altitude remained a statistically significant factor, but it was less significant than it was in the original five-way ANOVA. Similarly, the interaction between altitude and signal remained significant, but at a reduced level of significance. The interaction between the road network and altitude became statistically insignificant. These changes are underlined in the output shown below.

ვგზ ე ნ ቀ : ა ც ნ=		SUAVIVAL	I : UF VA				
ð-		BY NET					
		RATE					
. 4 0 =		VEL					
- 3 6 =		ALT					
: 61		SIGMA					
: :/2 0= 1	* * * *	* * * * * * * * *		* * *	****		
. <u></u> 							
. 4Ø=							
5 5 9 =			SUM OF		HEAN		SIGNIF
6760= 5	ajoracje (de	VARIATION	JOUARES	DF	SQUARE	F	OF F
.778=							
.78 0= M	AIN LEFEC	TS .	4681.958	5	936.390	171.323	.061
5 / 1 6 =	NET		42.3.025	1	4223.025	772.652	.881
E 30=	HATE		280.900	1	280.965	51.394	. 88 i
F;10=	vEL		1,225	1	1.225	.224	.637
50 8 4	461		52,49 8	1	32.400	5.928	.016
	SIGMA		144,466	1	144.466	26.429	.861
40)=							
o 5 0 ° 2	-WAY INTO	RACTIONS	1163.050	19	118,305	21.645	
5 50=	NET	RATE	.625	ì	.625		
576=	NET	VEL	.488	1	.408		
- 8 9 =	N. T		2,625	_ 1	2.025		
88 99 =	NET.	SIGMA	1071.225	ì	1071.225		
b / 08 =	FATE	VEL.	.225	1	.225		
€⇒.0=	FATE	ALT	.400	1	.496		
ē 2 9 =	RATE	SISHA	02.500	1	62.500		
£93 ĕ =	AEF	ALT	5,625	1	5.625		
H 3 40 =	Vf.L	SIGMA	.025	1	.025		
e . ∫ 0 =	AL.T	LIGMA	48.000	1	40.000	7.318	.008

Appendix F

Five-Way ANOVA with Sigma Held Constant

When sigma was held constant at level one (6.25 NM), only one major change occurred; the interaction between the road network and aircraft altitude became statistically insignificant.

g-7 0 :				SUM OF		HEAN		SIGNIF
3 • ⊕ ∦ =	SOURCE OF	VARIATION		SHUARES	ŰF	SQUARE	F	OF F
3178=								•
4390=	MAIN EFFE	115		1589.333	5	317.867	41,642	. 661
4018=	NET			453,333	1	653,333	85.598	
4016-	RATE			340.033	1	340.033	44.546	
435∌=	VEL			7.500	1	7.566	.983	
4340=	ALT			588.467	2	294,233	38.546	.661
4050=								
4666=	2-WAY INT	ERACTIONS		50.100	9	5.567	.729	.681
4976=	NET	RATE		2,133	1	2.133		
48-0=	NET	VEL		.133	i	.133		
4016=	NET	ALT		11.467	2	5.733	.751	.475
4:00=	RATE	VEL		2.700	1	2.788		
4.10=	RATE	ALT		20.267	2	10.133	1.328	.276
4) 2#=	VEL	ALT		13.400	2			
4130=								
4148=	3-WAY INT	ERACTIONS		31,933	7	4.562	.598	.756
4.50=	NET	RATE	VEL	4.866	1	4.866	.629	.436
4158=	NET	RATE	ALT	4.467	2	2.233	. 293	.747
4178=	NET	VEL.	ALT	3.267	2	1.633	.214	.868
4130=	RATE	VEL	ALT	19.400	2	9.700	1.271	.285
4:96=								
	4-WAY INT	ERACTIONS		15.866	2	7.986	1.035	.359
4.10=		RATE	VEL	15.8 00	2	7.988	1.035	.359
4. 70=		ALT						
4730=								
	EXPLAINED			1687.167	23	73.355	9.616	.001
425 6 =								
	RESIDUAL			732 .866	96	7.633		
4279=								
428 0 =	TOTAL			2 4 19 .9 67	119	20.336		

the interaction between the road network and aircraft altitude again became statistically significant. In addition, the interaction between the road network and the aircraft arrival rate became statistically significant.

119-				SUM QF		NEAN		SIGNIF
	SUUNCL	VARIATION		nwuARES	DF	SAUARE	F	OF F
÷ ķķ÷								
· respic	Page (155)	.15		5785.042	5	1357.008	491.225	.001
4 D-	NET.			6445.408	i	6645.4082	405.578	.001
4 #=	5416			66. 89 8	1	866.33	23.894	.831
4, 59=	VLL.			3.008	1	3.008	1.689	.299
். க்றிக	AL.			70.617	2			
4,5%=								
40 y∯=	2-WAY INT	ERACTIONS		41.575	9	4.619	1.672	.196
4,47∯=	NET	RATE		14.808	1	14.008		
438 8 ≥	NET	VEL		3.968	1	3.008	1.689	.299
4::7Ø=	NE T	ALT		21.717	2	10,858	3.931	.023
0 . Elg] =	SATE	VEL	*	.008	1	.008	.003	.956
4118=	RATE	ALT		1.217	2	.698	.220	.8#3
4 6=	VEL	ALT		1.617	2	.898	.293	.747
4:30=								
4:40=	3-WAY INT	ERACTIONS		14.525	7	2.075	.751	.629
4 5 6 =	NET	RATE	VEL	.675	1	.675	.244	.622
41,5∰=	NE.T	RATE	ALT	11.317	2	5.658	2.648	,135
4:76=	NET	VEL	ALT	1.517	2	.758	.275	.761
4:80=	RATE	VEL	ALT	i.017	2	.508	.18	.832
4170=								
4:00=	4-WAY INT	ERACTIONS		13.650	2	6.825	2,471	. 696
4, 10=	NET	RATE	VEL	13.650	2	6.825	2.471	. 898
4, 20=		ALT						
4230-								
4, 48=	EXPLAINEL)		6854.792	23	298.634	107.886	661
4250=								
4.60=	RESIDUAL			265 .200	96	2.763		
4270=	:							
4/80=	TOTAL			7119.992	119	59.832		

The cell heads of the interactions between the road network and directaft arrival rate are shown below. This data is presented graphically in Figure 17.

920=	i	KA1	t.		
90 0 =			:		2
948= NE:					
Ý5 ⊌ ÷	1		14.33		18.53
56 0 =		(391	(381
970=					
98∂ ∶	-		5.13		97
998:		((B)	(36)

Appendix G

Four-Way ANOVA with Airspeed Excluded

desults of the four-way ANOVA with airspeed excluded were the same as the results of the five-way ANOVA.

11.8				5 04 07		HEAN		SIGNIF
· P ·	Charle of V	ARTATION		SQUARES	ΰ÷	SBUARE	F	OF F
15,0								
. தத்	HAIN FOFE, I	2		6659.52) 5733.637	5	1331.864	264.050	.661
3/782	Nt.			57 3 3. 0 37	1	5703.0371	136.610	.661
	half			352.837	1	352.637	69.952	.001
	AL T			516.406	2	258.264	51.191	.661
غ الله الله الله الله الله الله الله الل	SIGMA			57. 6 37	1	57.037	11.308	.661
3:16=								
1 3= 2-WAY INTERACTIONS				1813.621	9	201.513	39 .95 1	.001
355 0 -	Nt. T	RATE		13.538	1	13.538	2.684	.103
3.40=	Ni T	ALT		32.025	2	16.013		
<u></u>	NE.7	SIGMA		1565.704		1565.784		
306 0 =	RATE	ALT		6.475	2	3.238	.642	.527
3:12:		SIGNA		53.204		50.264		
3-50-	ÄL.T	SIGMA		142.675	2	71.337	14.143	.661
3690=								
3 v in 18 =	3-WAY INTER	RACTIONS		33.496	7		,949	
3×10=	NET	RATE		14.725		7.363		
3, _6=	NET	RATE	SIGNA	2.604		2.684		
3430=	MET	ALT	SIGNA	1.158	2	.579		
5,49=	RATE	ALT	SIGNA	15 .00 8	2	7.564	1.488	.228
3,50=								
STORE 4-WAY INTERACTIONS				1.058	2	.529		
3470=	NET	RATE	ALT	1.058	2	.529	. 165	.906
376₩=		SIGMA						
3,40=								
	EXPLAINED			85 87.49 6	23	369.891	73.333	. 551
4: 8=								
	RESIDUAL			1489.500	216	5.844		
40.9=								
4849=	TOTAL			9596.996	239	40.155		

Appendix H

Tests of Statistical Distributions

5P3S tests for the following distributions are presented in this Appendix:

- 1. Exponential distribution of arrival times.
- 2. Normal distribution of AAA sites in belt 4, using road network 2 and sigma equal to 3.0 NM.
- 3. Normal distribution of AAA sites in belt 5, using road network 2 and sigma equal to 6.25 NM.

The distribution of arrival times was tested using a Chi-Square test, while the distribution of the AAA sites were tested with a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. All three tests used an alpha of .05, and in all three cases the null hypothesis that the data came from the desired distributions could not be rejected.

Distribution of Arrival Times

The arrival intervals, taken from 2 consecutive runs of 20 aircraft each, are listed below:

1.20	1.17	0.16	0.27	0.04	0.01	0.11	0.12
2.01	0.15	0.06	0.18	0.56	0.69	0.18	0.39
0.67	0.05	0.39	1.15	2.70	0.31	0.07	1.82
0.82	0.85	0.46	0.17	0.65	0.32	0.22	
1.60	0.03	0.04	0.72	0.41	0.31	0.95	

 $d_{\rm p}$. The 38 arrival intervals are from an exponential (.5 manutes) distribution.

 ${\rm E}_1$: The arrival intervals are not from an exponential (.5 minutes) distribution.

$$v = x - 1 - x = 5 - 1 - 0 = 4$$
 $X_{crit}^2 = 9.49$

239=	RUN NAME	ARRIVAL RATE EXPONENTIAL (.5 MINUTES)
246=	VARIABLE LIST	INTERVALIFREG
250=	INPUT FORMAT	FREEFIELD
26#=	INPUT MEDIUM	CARD
?7 9 =	WEIGHT	FREQ
280=	N OF CASES	5
296=	NPAR TESTS	CHI-SQUARE = INTERVAL/
3 66 =		EXPECTED = 6.89 5.64 8.48
31#=		7.7# 9.37
329=	READ INPUT DATE	A

1.222 < 9.49

 χ^2_{calc} < χ^2_{crit} for alpha equal to .05

Therefore we must fail to reject Ho.

Distribution of AAA Sites in Belt 4

This test was made to verify the normal distribution of weapon sites when sigma is set at 3.0 NM. Road network 2 was used because road network 1 would have produced a truncated normal distribution. The LOC is .8 NM to the right of the center of the army area when it crosses belt 4. Thus the defenses can fall up to

$$\frac{13.5 - .8}{3.0} = 4.23$$

standard deviations to the right of the mean point and up to

$$\frac{13.5 + .8}{3.0} = 4.77$$

standard deviations to the left. This will include, for all practical purposes, 100% of the random numbers drawn from a Normal (0.8, 3.0) distribution.

 ${\rm H}_{\rm O}\colon$ The 25 AAA sites come from a Normal (0.8. 3.0) distribution.

 $\mathrm{H}_1\colon$ The 25 AAA sites do not come from a Normal (0.8, 3.0) distribution.

The computer program and data points are shown below:

```
100=RUN NAME
                  AAA BISTRIBUTION FOR BELT 4 (SIGNA = 3.4)
110=VARIABLE LIST POSITION
128=INPUT FORMAT FREEFIELD
136=INPUT MEDIUM CARD
148=N OF CASES
150=NPAR TESTS
                  K-S (NORMAL .8,3.8) = POSITION
160=READ INPUT DATA
176=-2.63 1.29 -2.61 2.67 -1.22
180= 2.51 6.08 2.57 1.63 .46
196= 5.86 -1.56 2.16 2.15 6.65
200= 1.34 2.17 -3.18 -3.16 -3.08
216= .74 -2.97 -3.54 -3.16 2.17
220=FINISH
236=#EOR
246=+EUF
```

The results are shown below:

N

```
48#= - - - - KOLMOCOROV - SMIRNOV COODNESS OF FIT TEST
49#=
566=
        POSITION
510=
52#= TEST DIST. - NORMAL (MEAN =
                                     .8666 STD. BEV. =
                                                             3.6666)
53#=
                          MAX (ABS DIFF)
                                           MAX (+ DIFF)
                                                          MAX (- BIFF)
549=
               CASES
                                                           - .6849
55#=
                25
                              .1576
                                             .1576
56#=
57#=
               K-S Z
                            2-TAILED P
58#=
               .788
                               .564
59#=
686=1AAA DISTRIBUTION FOR BELT 4 (SIGNA = 3.8)
```

Therefore the null hypothesis can not be rejected.

Distribution of AAA bites in Belt 5

This test was made to verify the normal distribution of veapon sites when sigma is set at 6.25 NM. Road network 2 is .7 NM to the right of the center of the army area when it cross belt 4. Thus the defenses can fall up to

$$\frac{13.5 - .7}{9.25} = 2.05$$

standard deviations to the right of the mean point and up

$$\frac{13.5 + .7}{6.25} = 2.27$$

ł

standard deviations to the left. This will include approximately 97% of the random numbers drawn from a Normal (0.7,6.25) distribution. Thus the actual distribution should not be expected to behave perfectly, but it should closely approximate the theoretical distribution.

 $\rm H_{O}\colon$ The 25 AAA sites come from a Normal (0.7,6.25) distribution.

H₁: The 25 AAA sites do not come from a Normal (0.7,6.25) distribution.

The computer program and data points are shown below:

```
166=RUN NAME
                  AAA DISTRIBUTION FOR BELT 5 (SIGMA = 6.25)
110=VARIABLE LIST POSITION
120=INPUT FORMAT FREEFIELD
130=INPUT MEDIUM
                CARD
149=N OF CASES
                 25
150=NPAR TESTS
                 K-S (NORMAL .7,6.25) = POSITION
168=READ INPUT DATA
176= 3.96 5.16 -4.78 -16.15 -2.98
189= 4.24 -5.82 1.60 7.61 -11.74
198= -3.44 1.23 1.92 .44 -1.66
200= 1.52 9.11 -2.56 -4.17 -11.12
216= -1.59 -11.16 13.23 8.52 -4.66
220=FINISH
23#=#EOR
240=+EOF
```

The results are shown below:

```
488= - - - - KOLMOCOROV - SMIRNOV COODNESS OF FIT TEST
496=
500=
        POSITION
516=
520= TEST DIST. - NORMAL (MEAN = .7000 STD. DEV. =
                                                              6.2566)
539=
549=
               CASES
                          MAX (ABS DIFF)
                                            MAX (+ DIFF)
                                                           MAX (- BIFF)
55#=
                  25
                               .163#
                                               .1639
                                                             -.#256
56#=
57#=
               K-S Z
                             2-TAILED P
58#=
                .815
                                .520
59#=
600=1AAA DISTRIBUTION FOR BELT 5 (SICMA = 6.25)
```

.1630 < .27

D < D for alpha equal to .05 max crit

Therefore the null hypothesis can not be rejected.

Appendix I

Probability of Rill Computions

Inis Appeadix contains probability of kill computions for the AAA and SAM-C. These results are compared to computer generated results in order to verify the accuracy and logic of the PROBKIL subroutine of the model.

$A\,A\,A$

The incoming aircraft is offset .3 NM (1824 feet) from the gun and therefore will be engaged at a slant range of 3000 feet. There are 2 "g"s on the aircraft at the time it is fired upon.

The velocity of the AAA round at intercept is:

The time of flight of the bullet is:

TOF =
$$\left(\frac{6601.76}{1937}\right)$$
 - 2.1645 = 1.244 seconds

The single shot probability of kill is:

$$P_{k_{SS}} = \frac{\frac{-.5(2)(32.2)(1.244)^{2}}{2\pi (60)^{2} + 55.65}}{2\pi (20\cdot3)^{2} + 55.65} = .00245$$
Exprebability of kill for a 50 round burst is:

The probability of kill for a 50 round burst is:

$$Pkss = 1 - (1 - .0024486) = .11536$$

The attached computer output shows that the model generated the same Pk as was calculated by hand.

SAM-C

The incoming aircraft is offset 5 NM (9260 meters or 39.67 dbm) laterally from the missile site. It is travelling at a velocity of 480 knots. The missile can intercept the aircraft

$$2 + 5(3.09) = 17.45 \text{ sec}$$

after the aircraft first enters the kill zone, assuming it is able to track and lock-on to the aircraft in the minimum time possible.

Since a 480 knot aircraft is moving at a rate of 7.5 sec/NM, it will travel

past the leading edge of the kill zone before being intercepted by the missile. From Figure 9, it can be determined that the aircraft will have an aspect of about

97 relative to the missile site at the time of intercept. Since the model uses the radar cross-section of the nearest 5 increment, 19.95 dbm, the radar cross-section at the 35 aspect is used to calculate the jamming-to-signal ratio at the time of intercept.

$$J/s = 29.6 + 11 + 2(39.67) - 53 - 41 - 19.95 = 5.99 db$$

= 3.97

The circular error probable of the missile is

CEP =
$$\sqrt{(.00000071)(3.97)(9260)^2 + (2200)(3.97) + 58}$$

= 95.0 meters = 312 feet

The probability of kill of the missile is:

$$2$$
(86/312)

Pk = 1 - .5 = .051

The attached computer output agrees with the above results.

ÇAM-Ç

,MA 80,2 ≥ 7,0048 JASP443 .MA 40,2 ≥ 793,7277,1 14 30044 .176, ≥ 5 The missile's hignest Pk will occur if it can intercept the aircraft when the aircraft's aspect is 90° with respect to the site. The calculations for this intercept are as follows:

$$J/S = 29.6 + 11 + 2(39.37) - 53 - 41 - 24.98$$

$$= .96 \text{ db} = 1.25$$

$$CEP = \sqrt{(.000000/1)(1.25)(9260)} + (2200)(1.25) + 58$$

$$= 53.7 \text{ meters} = 1/6 \text{ feet}$$

$$2 \\ (86/176)$$

$$Pk = 1 - .5 = .153$$

Such an intercept is not possible in the model because the kill zone is too narrow and the aircraft is moving too fast. However, the logic pattern of the PROBKIL subroutine was tested on a verification run by setting the missile flyout time equal to zero. Under these circumstances, the intercept could have occured near the leading edge of the kill zone. The model had the site wait until it could achieve the intercept at a 90° aspect, which is consistent with the desired logic pattern. The results, shown below, agree with the prediction.

5A7-9

LATERAL GANGE : 5,00 NM. RANGE AT INTERGER" - 5,00 NM. REP. 153

Appendix J

Tie-Up Times of Weapon Systems

This Appendix contains examples of computer generated output which illustrate the logic and accuracy of the model in determining which weapon sites are allowed to fire at an aircraft and how long the sites are tied up after firing.

In the output listed below, the first aircraft reaches the first AAA belt .025 minutes after crossing the FEBA (the AAA is referred to as weapon 1 in this output). At least five AAA sites are within range of the aircraft. The following sites fire and are tied up for the time periods listed:

<u>Site</u>	Tie-Up Time	(in minutes)
2 3		.652
2 5		.703
4		.837
16		.730
20		.732

The aircraft reaches the second AAA belt .125 minutes after FEBA penetration. Three sites in this belt are within range. They fire and are tied up as listed below:

Site	Tie-Up Time (in minutes)
2 4	.831
5	.637
19	.609

Based on the above information the sites would be expected to be released as shown:

<u>Belt</u>	Site	Release Time (in minutes)
1	2 3	.025 + .652 = .677
1	25	.025 + .703 = .728
2	19	.125 + .609 = .734
1	16	.025 + .730 = .755
1	20	.025 + .732757
2	5	.125 + .637 = .762
1	4	.025 + .837 = .862
2	24	.125 + .831 = .956

The weapon sites do release at the times given above, as the computer output shows:

- 2,40 BELT 1 OF WEAPON 1
- 0358- INCH = .625
- wilds a sites are already Tieb UP.
- 150
- v300: FK OF SINE 23. = .1153753145851
- ¥ 0004 PK 00 SITE 25. ± .1150750145851
- . Jud: Pt OF SITE 4. = .02444412741602
- PRINT PRINTE SETE 16. = .01659925016575
- 89.8: FK OF 911F 20. = .81624861977525
- 6703- SITE 20. OF BELT 1. OF MUAPON 1. IS TIED UP FOR .6517491742866 MINUTES
- 0940: SITE 25, OF BELT 1. OF WLAPON 1, 13 TIED UP FOR .7034866958805 MINUTES
- # THE SITE 4. OF BELT 1. OF WEAPON 1. IS THED UP FOR .8373513388346 MINUTES
- Figure SITE 16. OF BELT 1. OF WEAPON 1. IS TIED UP FOR .7297435644773 MINUTES
- 6970= SITE 20. OF BELT 1. OF WEAPON 1. IS TIED UP FOR .732349897998 MINUTES

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         1. 8 1994 1 (1975)
         1 -8- 0 SITES ARE ALMERET STEE UP.
            THE REPORT OF A STREET
       1. %* PK 3 (178 1. - 8.
       TILDE SITE 2. IF EECT 1, IN WEAPON I, IN FIED OF FOR 1.147941615611 MINUTES
       1 WW- SITE 23 IS RELEASED AN TIME .678/491742066 FROM BECT 1 OF MEAPON 1
     1.16=
     1220- 5170 25 15 RELEASED AT TIME .T. 64846958805 FROM BELT 1 OF WEAPON 1
     3-
     1240= SITE 19 15 RELEASER AT TIME .7540804337913 FROM BELT 2 OF NEAPON 1
     1 NOT SITE 16 IB RELEASES AT TIME . FF47435844773 FROM BELT 1 OF WEAPON 1
   1178=
 1290= SITE 20 18 RELEASED AT TIME 1/57349897998 FROM BELT 1 OF WEAPON 1
1 WAR SITE 5 IS RELEASED AT TIME .7628722275544 FROM BELT 2 OF WEAPON 1
ADJUST SIRE 4 IC RELEASED AT TIME .88,3518388346 FROM BELT 1 OF MEAPON 1
1 1100
 1148: PITE 24 IS RELEASED AT TIME . 4564167757031 FROM BELT 2 OF WEAPON 1
```

other properties of the model are illustrated when the third and fourth fighters enter the network. Aircraft number three enters, tying up four AA sites in belt one. When aircraft number four enters, the four sites in belt one tied up by aircraft number three are unable to engage it.

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9 B
             at with me
 . 2882 - 1984 - 1,1984 - 555641
                                               Aircraft #3 enters
LONG A TEN LAKE ALM ALT TIED UP.
. છેઇ
2110= Fr. 1 110E 20. = . 15.75814585
1120= Fr. 1 17E 25. - .1152758145851
1100- +6 07 0116 4. + 100500801705105
1145- ek 35 1,76 15. - .07714000452671
1150- PK W. 1712 1. - 0.
1160: NITE 1. OF BEED 1. OF WEAPON 1. IS TIED UP FOR 19128997154233 MINUTES
2178= 0178 25. OF BEL! 1. OF WEAPON 1. IS TIED OF FOR .6730841146171 MINUTES
2180= 2175 4. OF BEL! 1. OF WEAPON 1. IS TIED UP FOR .6090108009086 MINUTES
DISG: SITE 18. OF BELT 1. OF WEARDN 1. IS TIED UP FOR .6464012505524 MINUTES
2210- SITE 2 IS RELEASED AT TIME 2.483173771124 FROM BELT 1 OF WEAPON 3
1220=
7230: BELT 2 OF WEAPON 1
2240= TNOW = 2.490492588848
7850= 0 SITES ARE ALREADY TIED UP.
. 260=
1270= PK OF SITE 24. = .04164383715585
1280- PK OF SITE 5. = .03412139987481
7290= PK OF SITE 19. = .07188807988899
1300= PK OF BITE 1. = 0.
7310= PK OF SITE 1. = 9.
2320 SITE 24. OF BELT 2. OF WEAPON 1. IS TIED UP FOR .6424880130581 MINUTES
1330: SITE 5. OF BELT 1. OF WEAPON 1. IS TIEB UP FOR .7140992894937 MINUTES
1340= SITE 19. OF BELT 2. OF HEAPON 1. IS TIED UP FOR .8992477962203 MINUTES
/ 35v =
7360= BELT : OF WEAPON 1
                                                Aircraft #4 enters
2370: TNOW = 2.547957810288
1380: 4 SITES ARE ALREADY TIED UP.
. :98=
:400= PK OF SITE 20. = .05905224949717
418= PK OF SITE 1. = 0.
14.8= PK OF SITE 1. = 6.
1430= PK OF SITE 1. = 0.
2440= PK OF SITE 1. = 0.
2450= SITE 20. OF BELT 1. OF WEAFON 1. IS TIED UP FOR .8496394058775 MINUTES
```

The output below shows an aircraft entering the second SAM-D belt (the SAM-D is referred to as weapon 3). Two SAM-D sites are within range of the aircraft, but only one is allowed to fire because the Pk of the second site is below .02.

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Appendix K

Modeling Current Weapon Systems

This appendix is classified SECRET. It is kept and maintained by the Air Force Institute of Technology, AFIT/ENA.

Vita

Warren J. Leek was born on 4 June 1944 in Wellington, New Zealand. He graduated from high school in Midlothian, Illinois in 1962 and then attended the United States Air Force Academy. He was awarded a Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering Science and was commissioned in June 1966. He completed pilot training and received his wings in August 1967. He served in operational assignments in the EC-47, F-100, A-7D, and OV-10 aircraft before entering the School of Engineering, Air Force Institute of Technology, in August 1979.

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Vita

Richard W. Schmitt was born on 14 March 1945 in Orlando, Florida. He graduated from Mira Loma High School, Sacramento, California in 1963 and then attended the United States Air Force Academy. He was awarded a Bachelor of Science degree and was commissioned in June 1967. He completed pilot training and received his wings in September 1968. He has served in operational F-4 assignments in Korea, South Viet Nam, Thailand, United Kingdom, and Iran. He served as Commander, 4950th Organizational Maintenance Squadron, Wright-Patterson AFB, before entering the School of Engineering, Air Force Institute of Technology, in August 1979.

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A model of the terrain features and threat scenario was constructed using the SLAM computer simulation language. The Soviet defensive systems can be moved around as desired, and aircraft can enter the system at a variety of arrival intervals, airspeeds, and altitudes. Defensive systems that are within range of the aircraft will shoot at it, provided they are not tied up with a previous aircraft, blocked by terrain, or prevented from shooting because of a low probability of kill.

The capability to fly faster did not significantly increase the fighter's survivability. A decrease in altitude from 1000 feet to 500 feet increased survivability to a minor degree, while a further decrease to 250 feet improved survivability significantly. These findings led to the conclusion that a strong effort should be made to develop a FLIR of high enough resolution to allow the pilot to fly the mission at an altitude of 250 feet or below.

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